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1. Introduction 
 
“In looking for people to hire, look for three qualities: integrity, intelligence, and energy. 
And if they don’t have the first one, the other two will kill you.” 
Warren Buffett 
(Source: “Success Will Come and Go, But Integrity is Forever”, Forbes Magazine, 28.11.2012) 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
World news in the recent past has been conspicuous for the number of illegal activities 
perpetrated by companies and banks – a trend that is evidently continuing. Increasing 
globalization combined with macroeconomic turbulence has led to an intensification of 
competition and consequent pressure to perform, which can apparently no longer be 
contained within legal limits. 
As a result, cases of corruption, bribery, and money laundering, as well as restatements 
and settlement payments are appearing more frequently in public. These incidents 
motivate the question: Is the impression of increasing frequency just subjective or is it 
backed by firm evidence? 
The following chart illustrates the present author‟s investigation of illegal economic 
activity on the part of banks from January 2012 to December 2013. The events can be 
divided into "restatements", "money laundering", "corruption and bribery" and 
"settlement payments". The focus lies exclusively on banks: other companies have not 
been considered. An analysis of these events shows that within the short period of two 
years all in all forty cases of illegal economic activity have prominently occurred in the 
world. For example Goldman Sachs has had a case of bribery in 2012
1
 and JP Morgan 
                                                          
1
 http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/us-investmentbank-berlin-rechnet-mit-goldman-
sachs-ab/3417244.html 
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a case of manipulation in 2012 as well.
2
 Our focus lies on those cases which can be 
subdivided into fifteen cases of restatement, fourteen cases of corruption and bribery, 
ten cases of money laundering, and one case of settlement payment. Furthermore, it is 
worth mentioning that during these two years only five months elapsed without the 
appearance of any such event. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/barclays-ex-chef-bob-diamond-soll-
zinsmanipulation-angeordnet-haben-a-844761.html 
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Figure 1: Cases of Bank Misbehavior during 2012 and 2013 
Source: Research 
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Considering the fact that private as well as professional investors commit their 
financial investments to banks, the important role of trust becomes obvious. Since 
1979 Gallup has conducted an analysis every year to determine the development of 
trust of U.S. Americans in American banks. The Gallup Organization is one of the 
leading market research bureaus and polling firms in Washington D.C. An 
examination of the following chart reveals that at the beginning in 1979 60% of 
respondents said they had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" (as opposed to "some" or "very 
little") trust in American banks. By 2012 this confidence had fallen to a record low of 
21%.
3
 
 
 
At this point a first brief summary can already be made: obviously there is a 
connection between the illegal activities of banks and their fading public reputation. 
Thus, the steepest fall in trust accompanies the financial crisis. One clue is the Occupy 
movement, which in 2011 was characterized by protest against the global financial 
system. Further evidence lies in Ernst & Young‟s survey of 28,500 bank customers 
worldwide about the quality of banks, which revealed the following primary reasons 
for the loss of trust in the banking sector: disaffection with the practice and level of 
                                                          
3
 See: http://www.gallup.com/poll/155357/americans-confidence-banks-falls-record-low.aspx 
Figure 2: Confidence in Banks between 1979 and 2012 
Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/155357/americans-confidence-banks-falls-record-low.aspx 
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bonus payments (56%), macroeconomic results of the financial crisis (55%), and poor 
quality of consulting by banking houses and their staff (42%).
4
 
In Germany, the economic and financial daily Handelsblatt reported shareholder 
dissatisfaction with Commerzbank in May 2012. Even though the bank had made no 
dividend payments, it agreed to raise the salary of the CEO.
5
 And it emerged in 
December 2012 that a large-scale raid had been conducted at the head office of 
Deutsche Bank to find evidence for money laundering and tax fraud.
6
 
 
This is just a sample illustrating the dimensions of illegal activity in the banking 
sector. Unquestionably these are not petty matters. The next step, however, in 
developing the raison d‟être for this thesis is to look at the banks‟ point of view. Are 
they aware of their behavior and, more importantly, have they set any behavioral rules 
or guidelines? A further investigation by the author in 2013 sought to determine 
whether the banks had learnt from their bad recent experiences. The following chart 
shows results for 84 parent banks: 
 
A Code of Conduct is an instrument used to express practical behavioral guidelines for 
a company or a bank. The expressions “Code of Conduct” or “Code of Ethics” 
represent a formal written compilation of moral standards of behavior in conformity 
                                                          
4
 Cf. http://www.focus.de/finanzen/banken/eine-krise-nach-der-anderen-vertrauen-der-kunden-in-
die-bankenbranche-schwindet_aid_772497.html. 
5
 Cf. http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken/commerzbank-aktionaere-verlieren-die-
geduld-mit-blessing/6663674.html. 
6
 Cf. http://www.n-tv.de/wirtschaft/Auch-Fitschen-ist-auf-dem-Radar-article9758586.html. 
Figure 3: Percentage of Bank Statements concerned with Integrity and Code of Conduct in 2013 
Source: Own figure 
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with the corporate business culture that is obligatory on all company employees.
7
 
Raiborn and Payne (1990) reckon that the numerous scandals affecting companies 
require a complete modernization of corporate management standards. Companies 
should draw up binding "Codes of Conduct"
8
, and endeavor to enhance behavioral 
standards by conducting seminars, opinion polls and courses of instruction. Some of 
these restructuring measures have been stimulated by pressure from outside, while 
others are based on the fact that entrepreneurs are becoming increasingly aware of their 
social responsibility.
9
 However, since the requirements of a Code of Conduct are 
highly ethical, their standards have to be implemented by members of civil society 
rather than by the companies themselves.
10
 
Paine (1994) appeals to managers to underpin the ethics of organizations because they 
are the instruments necessary to make the company‟s business relationships and 
reputation generate success.
11
 Moreover she shows that everyday strategies of integrity 
prevent violations of the ethical sense of other individuals and hence simplify and 
foster the work flow.
12
 Paine (1994) distinguishes between compliance and integrity, 
defining compliance as conformity with the laws normalized by the state, and integrity 
as individual self-control, which she sees as much more effective. Integrity guarantees 
an adequate working atmosphere, supports ethical conformity, and conveys the feeling 
of shared responsibility for each other among company employees, as well as 
responsibility for the company itself.
13
 
 
Verschoor (1998) analyzed the Code of Conduct of 500 U.S. companies in connection 
with their performance. Of these companies, 26.8% affirmed ethically correct behavior 
in conformity with accepted standards. In his study he established a significant positive 
relation between adherence to a "Code of Conduct" and company performance.
14
                                                          
7
 Cf. Schwartz (2001), p. 389. 
8
 Cf. Raibornand  Payne (1990), p. 879. 
9
 Cf. Raiborn and Payne (1990), p. 881. 
10
 Cf. Raiborn and Payne (1990), p. 880. 
11
 Cf. Paine (1994), p. 106. 
12
 Cf. Paine (1994), p. 107. 
13
 Cf. Paine (1994), p. 111. 
14
 Cf. Verschoor (1998), p. 1509. 
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Using a regression analysis based on the CV Index, Donker et al. (2008) analyzed the 
importance of ethical values on performance.
15
 They found a significant positive 
relation between these two variables and concluded that companies should make 
greater efforts to establish the relevant values in their practical business processes.
16
 
On the basis of these findings the significant role of the Code of Conduct seems 
obvious. The next step was to check bank homepages for the existence of such a Code. 
A further check would seek to determine the extent to which the spoken word was 
followed by action, this being a generally accepted test of integrity proposed in this 
instance by Jensen (2009) – the well-known Harvard professor who developed the 
principal-agent theory – who calls it “[…] honoring one‟s word […]”.17 In correlation 
with illegal activities it would further be interesting to see whether banks considered 
the issue of integrity as one of their rules. Here the results were surprising: 30.95% of 
the 84 banks surveyed have no Code of Conduct and 46.43% do not mention the word 
“integrity” either in their Code of Conduct or elsewhere on their homepage. These 
facts led the present author to investigate the influence of behavioral integrity in the 
banking sector in greater detail.  
 
1.2 Aims and Contributions 
 
The literature shows the development in scientific economics from an exclusive  focus 
on the analysis of hard facts like ratios and financial data to a broader perspective that 
includes the investigation of soft facts, e.g. in the fields of behavioral finance or 
corporate governance. These soft facts are intimately connected with the complexity of 
measuring the material: moral qualities ‒ or so-called soft skills ‒ like reputation and 
integrity.  
The focus of this thesis is, then, on two types of immaterial value: reputation and 
integrity. Several studies have already shown the importance of a company‟s 
reputation, and a few also provide initial results for integrity. The aim of the present 
                                                          
15
 The CV Index contains enterprise values and among these integrity. 
16
 Cf. Donker et al. (2008), p. 536. 
17
 Erhard et al. (2010), p. 3. 
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project is to determine whether, and if so how, the bond market perceives and values 
these two soft skills.  
To achieve this target the objects (i.e. values) in question must be measured. In this 
thesis, reputation will initially be measured by the Fortune Most Admired Score, 
applied to underwriters. This will check whether the U.S. bond market esteems a 
bank‟s reputation, and how strongly it does so.  Since the Fortune Most Admired Score 
is already established in the field of economics as a measure of reputation, it will be 
used here to review Andres et al. (2014), who use market share as a measure of a 
bank‟s reputation in the same market.  
A further aim of this thesis is to find new variables to measure integrity and analyzing 
its impact on bond performance and company´s costs. In detail the variables proposed 
for this purpose are: 
1. Restatement of operating results 
2. Settlement payments 
3. Money-laundering 
4. Corruption and bribery 
5. Class action lawsuits 
6. Embezzlement and Misappropriation 
7. Misuse 
 
Implementation of the first variable, restatements of operating results, follows several 
authors who have already used this proxy to measure integrity.
18
 The remaining seven 
variables are newly created and have not yet, so far as the present author is aware, been 
used as proxies for integrity. This thesis is, therefore, the first to measure integrity via 
settlement payments, money-laundering, corruption and bribery, class action lawsuits, 
embezzlement and misappropriation, misuse and regulatory enforcements and measure 
its influence on bond performance and company´s costs. This represents the original 
research contribution of this study. 
Using the Fortune Most Admired Score and the variables for integrity the thesis aims 
to demonstrate a correlation between ethical behavior, in the form of integrity and a 
corresponding high reputation, and a company‟s costs and performance.
                                                          
18
 Cf. Graham et al. (2007); Gaa (2007); Cao et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2013). 
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The measurement process applied to this matter entails logit and OLS regression 
analysis for both reputation and integrity. The dependent variables are: 
1. First rating action downgrade 
2. Yield spread and gross spread. 
Using a logit regression and first rating action downgrade as dependent variables 
enables identification of factors that decrease the likelihood of a downgrade as the next 
rating action. Hence, the impact of reputation and integrity on bond performance can 
be checked.   
The two different dependent variables “yield spread” and “gross spread” and the 
ordinary least squared regression will be used to measure the impact of reputation and 
integrity on price. Yield spread represents a company‟s costs and should rise if the 
market is aware of high reputation and integrity. Likewise banks with high reputation 
and integrity will demand higher fees as gross spreads.  
All of these dependent variables have already been approved as high-grade 
parameters.
19
 The regression analysis is completed by the addition of many control 
variables that have shown a significant impact on the dependent variables in the past. 
No specific hypotheses are constructed for these variables, because the focus of the 
thesis is on the parameters of integrity and reputation. Nevertheless, reference is also 
made to the significant results of these control variables as reinforcement for the main 
thrust of the argument. 
 
1.3 Structure of Thesis 
 
The structure of this thesis is based on the motivation, aims and contributions pointed 
out above. In a first step the theoretical background will be illuminated by 
investigating the fundamental problem highlighted by the principal-agent theory: the 
separation of ownership and control that has led to the appearance of so many cases of 
illegal bank behavior. The evident impact of such behavior on a bank‟s credibility 
makes it necessary to define the immaterial values of reputation and integrity, and to 
investigate their economic significance. This will also form part of Chapter 2. The 
                                                          
19
 Cf. Andres et al. (2014); Fang (2005); Livingston and Miller (2000) 
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theoretical background will be complemented with a presentation of the empirical 
evidence of misbehavior in Chapter 3. An investigation of the way in which 
misbehavior on the one hand and the correlative immaterial assets on the other have 
been analyzed by economists is a precondition for developing hypotheses and 
methodology for the empirical analysis. This will form part of Chapters 4 and 5, 
leading immediately up to the empirical analysis. Finally the empirical analysis itself 
will constitute Chapter 6. Chapter 7 will present the conclusions of the investigation, 
together with a future outlook. The conceptual framework of the thesis is illustrated 
below in Fig. 4. 
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Figure 4: Conceptual Framework of the Thesis 
Source: Own figure 
  
 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical background for the empirical analysis. First, the 
fundamental problem of the separation of ownership and control will be explained in 
terms of the principal-agent theory. This theory is so important that its development, 
and the contributions made to it by different branches of economics, will be described 
in detail.  
The next step will be to define as clearly as possible the two immaterial values 
„integrity‟ and „reputation‟ and determine their economic (and academic) significance. 
In this way light will be shed on the elemental role of both these values in the economy 
on the one hand and the relatively young field of scientific economics on the other. In 
both these respects the recent surge in misbehavior by banks and companies described 
in Chapter 1 will be taken into consideration. The problem of measuring integrity will 
be addressed and explicated in Chapter 3, which generally summarizes the empirical 
evidence of misbehavior. This chapter will close with Fortune‟s „Most Admired 
Companies‟ scale, and the leading role of this scale in the scientific assessment of 
reputation will become clear.  
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2.1 The Principal-Agent Theory 
 
The separation of ownership and control, as between the owner of a company and an 
appointed manager,
20
 leads to problems of uncertainty and information asymmetry.
21
 
This set of problems is described by the principal-agent theory. The agent‟s decisions 
have an impact on his own as well as on the principal‟s prosperity. But these decisions 
cannot always be controlled or monitored by the principal.
22
 In classical principal-
agent conflict the owner suffers damage caused by the manager‟s or agent‟s activities. 
The principles of the principal-agent theory were outlined by Adam Smith in 1776. 
Adam Smith was a Scottish philosopher and one of the pioneers of the science of 
economics. In his publication An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations he describes the principles of the separation of ownership and control that 
form part of the principal-agent theory. His presentation in that work of the South Sea 
Company‟s trading portfolio, with a volume of £3.8 million plus the Bank of 
England‟s holding of £10.8 million clarifies these principles. In this context he calls 
the directors of such huge companies “managers of other people‟s money”, and 
continues that these managers perform their task with less attention than they pay to 
their own belongings.
23
 An investigation of the literature shows that Adam Smith 
(1776) was one of the first to pinpoint the principal-agent relationship and the conflicts 
arising from it. However he does not go into the economic impacts of separating 
ownership from control. 
Berle and Means (1932) picked up Smith‟s (1776) thoughts in 1932 in their 
publication The modern Corporation and Private Property.
24
 The authors define the 
modern corporation as a company in which the property of many individuals is pooled 
and managed by a professional manager. Historically, the focus lies increasingly on the 
separation of ownership and control in large companies, and the consequences of that 
separation. According to Berle and Means (1932), the transfer of control over one‟s 
own property leads to a new definition of ownership that requires reformulation of the 
                                                          
20
 Cf. Adams (1776), p. 408. 
21
 Cf. Arrow (1986), p. 1183. 
22
 Cf. Arrow (1986), p. 1184. 
23
 Cf. Smith (1776), p. 408. 
24
 Cf. Berle and Means (1932), p. 345. 
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mutual conditions governing it.
25
 They add that it is a precondition for the survival of 
society that the control units of large companies should comply not with their own 
needs but with the common good of society, and that every sector of society should 
therefore share in that control.
26
 Berle and Means (1932) thus offer one of the first 
approaches to solve the problem of principal-agent structure, although the 
development of this term only followed decades later. 
In the 1960s several economists (e.g. Radner (1964)
27
 and Wilson (1968)
28
) researched 
the behavior of decision makers acting under the condition of uncertainty and gaining 
payment dependent on their success. Wilson analyzed the interaction of different 
decision makers with diverse estimations of probability and risk tolerance with regard 
to uncertain events.
29
 According to Wilson (1968), it is necessary, in order to make 
consistent decisions, that any group of decision makers have the same risk tolerance 
and caution in comparable scenarios.
30
 Yet he fails to establish a relationship to the 
financial market except for a short example about an equity investment.
31
 Nevertheless 
his study shows that different risk tolerances among group participants who gain a 
collective income will produce conflict. This central idea can be transferred to the 
principal and agent and plays a role in the development of the principal-agent theory. 
Even though the terms „principal‟ and „agent‟ made no appearance in Wilson‟s (1968) 
publication, the 1970s saw an increase in their use (e.g. Stiglitz (1974)
32
 and Ross 
(1973)
33
). Stephen A. Ross (1973) developed the economic agency theory from which 
the principal-agent theory derived.
34
 Ross (1973) describes the relationship between 
principal and agent as one of the oldest and most codified of all social interactions. 
Examples of this relationship are universal and nearly all contractual agreements, like 
the relationship between employer and employee or state and governed, contain 
elements of it.
35
 In his study Ross (1973) aims to determine the optimal scale of fees 
between principal and agent by maximizing the utility functions of principal and agent. 
                                                          
25
 Cf. Berle and Means (1932), p. 2. 
26
 Cf. Berle and Means (1932), p. 2. 
27
 Cf. Radner (1964), p. 31. 
28
 Cf. Wilson (1968), p.119. 
29
 Cf. Wilson (1968), p. 120. 
30
 Cf. Wilson (1968), p. 131. 
31
 Cf. Wilson (1968), p. 130-131. 
32
 Cf. Stiglitz (1974), p.219. 
33
 Cf. Ross (1973), p. 134. 
34
 Cf. Jensen (1983), p. 334. 
35
 Cf. Ross (1973), p. 134. 
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He describes payment of the agent in accordance with his achievement as an effective 
construct. If the agent behaves exactly in the principal‟s interests, the principal has the 
highest benefit. With proportionate remuneration, the agent‟s benefit will also be 
maximized. So, following the principal‟s instructions is the best solution for both 
parties. Since the principal has no certainty about the agent‟s behavior Ross (1973) 
mentions the question of instituting a monitoring process. On the one hand, such a 
monitoring process would be helpful, but on the other hand it is problematic because it 
is not economically cost-efficient.
36
 
Contemporaneous with Ross‟s (1974) study Mitnick (1973) published his approach to 
the institutional agency theory. It is less quoted although, like Ross (1973), it shows 
structures of the principal-agent relationship and should, therefore, at least be 
mentioned here.
37
 
One of the most meaningful studies of the principal-agent theory in the field of finance 
is the 1976 publication by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who transfer all the ideas 
contributed so far concerning the agency theory to the financial sector and, in doing so, 
define the term „agency costs‟.38 Based on their findings the two authors define the 
term „company‟ in a new way, and show how shareholder value can be raised despite 
the payment of agency costs.
39
 The importance of this study demands that its results be 
expounded in some detail. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as: 
1. Monitoring 
2. Bonding expenditures 
3. Residual costs
40
 
Monitoring costs have to be paid by the principal to control the agent. On top of that, 
the principal will in most cases spend even more on committing (bonding) the agent to 
himself. Another instrument lies in the imposition of an obligation of confidentiality. 
Residual costs are defined as the difference between the hypothetically best solution in 
                                                          
36
 Cf. Ross (1974), p. 135. 
37
 Cf. Mitnick (1973), p. 1. 
38
 These are the costs the principal has to pay when hiring an agent. 
39
 Cf. Jensen and Meckling (1976), p. 1. 
40
 Cf. Jensen and Meckling (1976), p. 6. 
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the case of complete information and the actually realized solution.
41
 Agency costs are 
part of the agency theory as developed by Wilson (1968) and Ross (1973), i.e. as the 
relationship between applicant and contractor. In fact Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
distribute agency costs more accurately into three segments, whereas Ross primarily 
focuses on the principal‟s monitoring costs. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) acknowledge the fact that the agency problem had until 
then focused on the issue of motivating an agent to maximize the principal‟s wealth. 
But this problem can occur in every organization and form of cooperation, such as 
universities, agencies, offices and unions. The authors distinguish their approach from 
earlier studies which focused on normative aspects of agency theory,
42
 whereas their 
approach expresses the formal derivation of the optimal contractual relationship 
motivating the agent in a way that leads to a maximization of the principal‟s wealth.43 
Among earlier approaches are attempts to interpret existing contracts, as well as 
investigations of divergence from optimal status, instead of forming an optimal 
contract.
44
 
Other academic economists adopted Jensen and Meckling‟s (1976) interpretation of 
the modern company. Fama (1980) picks it up and develops it.
45
 He defines a company 
as a team whose members are motivated by self-interest, but at the same time accept 
that the survival of each individual in the team depends on the survival of the whole 
team in competition with other teams. In classical theory the agent is the entrepreneur-
manager who at the same time bears the residual risk. Fama (1980) criticizes the trend 
of the literature of the time to separate the manager from the shareholder. Thus he 
disagrees with the theory of property rights as set up by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Summing up, his main thesis says that the separation of share ownership from control 
must be accepted as an efficient type of economic organization. Hence, the owner‟s 
tasks should be treated as separate factors in a group of contracts that taken together 
represent the company.
46
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Three years later Hölmstrom (1979) picked up the idea of the principal-agent-
relationship, linking the expressions „moral hazard‟ and „information asymmetry‟ to it.  
The first term had been coined by Arrow in 1963 and dealt with the tendency to take  
greater risks if an insurance to cover the risk has been concluded 
beforehand.
47
Hölmstrom (1979) adapted this concept to the principal-agent-
relationship. After the contract has been concluded the agent can change his behavior. 
Hölmstrom (1979) explains that this subsequent hidden change in behavior is difficult 
to regulate by contract. One way is to increase investment in the agent‟s monitoring. 
The information gained might be included in later contracts. Simple scenarios make a 
complete monitoring of the agent possible and, furthermore, the optimal principal-
agent relationship to maximize wealth can be reached by contracts that punish 
dysfunctional behavior on the part of the agent. In contrast, complex scenarios are 
characterized by the high costs and enormous effort of monitoring.
48
 The author adds 
that alternative information systems like cost accounting can help optimize contracts. 
In reality the principal will always have incomplete information about the agent and 
his actions before closing the contract. This can only be remedied by monitoring over 
time.
49
 
Hölmstrom (1979) pinpointed a gap in research resulting from the fact that the models 
dealing with the principal-agent-relationship had until then only considered short-term 
effects. Multi-period long-term monitoring had not been undertaken.
50
 Fama‟s (1980) 
model had a single-period character, but in contrast to Jensen and Meckling (1976) he 
included the signaling effect of the agent‟s behavior on labor and capital markets.51 
It was Fama‟s (1980) idea that managers provide a company with their human capital, 
and that the future success or failure of managerial decisions has an impact on the 
company‟s capital market value. Company reputation and management remuneration 
are inextricably linked as parts of that corporate value.
52
 Fama (1980) investigated how 
signals from the labor market, as well as from the capital market, can discipline 
managers to counteract the typical principal-agent problem. He came to the conclusion 
that internal information systems at top management level represent a good counter to 
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middle management opportunism – after all, top management will be criticized first if 
the capital market sends negative signals. In due course this will affect the labor 
market and, finally, the top-manager‟s own reputation. One can, therefore, expect top-
managers to be interested in maximizing company wealth to prevent such negative 
impacts.
53
 Fama (1980) concludes that internal information systems such as the board 
of directors are suitable for reducing problems arising from the principal-agent 
relationship. This matches Hölmstrom‟s (1979) ideas. Fama (1980) maintains that real 
ownership structure is irrelevant: it is the pressure on the agent from capital markets 
and labor markets that makes him act in the shareholders‟ and/or principal‟s interests, 
thus enhancing the possibility of the company‟s survival.54 Fama‟s (1980) approach to 
solving the problematic relationship between principal and agent reverts in this way to 
an analysis of the role of capital and labor markets. 
Reviewing earlier studies in the context of the principal-agent relationship, Hölmstrom 
(1979) complained that all of them were based on single observation periods. This 
changed in 1981, when Radner (1981) investigated multiple-period models in which 
conditions over time remained constant.
55
 Lambert was in line with Radner‟s (1981) 
model, which implemented strategies containing an epsilon-equilibrium.
5657
 Lambert 
(1983), however, investigated the role of long-term contracts and how they reduce the 
problem of moral hazard.
58
 Since the agent‟s compensation in the second period 
depends on his behavior in the first period, the principal has the opportunity to 
diminish his uncertainty by analyzing the agent‟s performance.59 He shows that the 
agent has to make decisions about future investments. An investment today can reduce 
success in the current period but raise it in the following period. So it is important to 
record in the contract between principal and agent whether the agent makes short-term 
or long-term decisions. In this way the agent‟s motivation can be sustained through 
several periods.
60
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Summing up: Studies in the 1980s offered some approaches to reduce the problem of 
the principal-agent relationship – e.g. internal information systems by Fama (1980), or 
long-term contracts by Lambert (1983)– and the point of view changed in that decade 
from single period to multiple-period observation. Yet, the term principal-agent-theory 
was coined only in 1983 – by Jensen. According to Jensen and Meckling‟s 1976 study, 
agency theory can be subdivided into normative and positive approaches: normative 
theory deals with the determination of optimal contracts, which it aims simply to 
structure. Jensen (1983) gives the example of general price level accounting, where 
normative theory asks how changes in price can be implemented in reports. In contrast, 
positive theory deals with the impact of existing contracts: its purpose, therefore, is 
explanatory. Taking the example above, positive theory asks how existing accounting 
influences corporate value.
61
 Jensen (1983) describes himself as a representative of 
positive theory;
62
 in his 1983 publication he uses Ross (1973) and Hölmstrom‟s (1979) 
term „principal-agent‟ for the normative approach .63 
In 1986 Arrow published his study containing terms which had been adopted in 
educational books such as „hidden action‟ and „hidden information‟. The issue of 
hidden actions had previously been investigated by Ross in 1973 but Arrow (1986) 
formed the terms as they are used today. He describes hidden actions as the agent‟s 
activity. It is difficult for the principal to observe the real thrust of the agent‟s efforts. 
Hidden information occurs in situations in which the agent has better information 
about the company and its processes than the principal. In this scenario the latter is no 
longer able to tell whether the agent is making use of his information wisely when 
making decisions.
64
  Both of these problems are based on information asymmetry – or 
what is also called moral hazard
65
 – and play an important role in economic theory. 
These two issues are complemented by a third: „hidden characteristics‟. Hence, there 
are overall three main problems of information asymmetry in principal-agent theory. 
„Hidden characteristics‟ is part of the concept of adverse selection proposed by Akerlof 
in 1970. Every supplier and/or agent knows the quality of his products. A potential 
purchaser or employer can only determine the quality when he has made a purchase. 
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This applies to the principal-agent-relationship as well as to products: in this case the 
agent‟s product is his commitment to work.66 
The core terms of the principal-agent-theory have now finally been assigned to their 
sources in economic theory. In doing so light has been shed on the development of the 
theory from its origins in the separation of ownership and control, followed by the 
behavior of groups gaining collective income, and leading to the distinct field of 
economics that deals with problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. In 
conclusion, it remains only to outline the contemporary impact of the principal-agent 
theory in the field of economics.  
The basic principal-agent-problem is the reason why corporate governance is 
necessary. Good corporate governance will choose the most talented managers and 
hold them responsible to shareholders.
67
 Corporate governance includes the question 
how investors can ensure earnings on their employed capital.
68
 A number of 
economists deal with this issue.
69
 Two different methods have been developed to 
reduce the fundamental problem of the principal-agent relationship: on the one hand 
mechanisms initiated by the company itself („internal governance‟); on the other 
mechanisms affecting the company from outside („external governance‟).   
The board of directors and management are an internal mechanism
70
 One way in 
which they can reduce the principal-agent problem is by adding payment incentives for 
managers in the contractual terms and conditions.
71
 Another way is by replacing equity 
with debt capital.
72
 This reduces the level of dividend payments in relation to interest 
to creditors. And interest must be paid whereas dividends can be paid. As fixed costs 
have to be paid, they represent an incentive for managers to perform efficiently.
73
 
External mechanisms include, for example, regulation policies and buy-outs. 
Regulation policies force managers to publish their accounts and reports, and protect 
investors by giving them the right to participate in stockholders‟ meetings and elect the 
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board of directors.
74
 Buy-outs occur if the buyer thinks that company profits and value 
will rise under new management. Theoretically the old management will be anxious to 
save its own position by maximizing performance.
75
 
This thesis is based on the fundamental problem of the separation of ownership and 
control, which is connected with the principal-agent-theory. Therefore it is necessary 
to understand the development of the problem and its details. In order to clarify this, a 
general overview is provided in the following illustration, which is intended as a 
complement to the continuous text.  
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Figure 5: The Development of the Principal-Agent-Theory over Time: An Overview 
Source: Own figure 
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2.2 Integrity and Reputation as Intangible Assets of Banks 
 
The following two chapters will give an overview of current definitions of integrity 
and reputation and outline the approaches that will form the basis for the empirical 
analysis presented later in this thesis. It is important to define these two immaterial 
values and show the role they play in the field of economics before addressing the 
problem of measuring them.  
Since there is no established measurement for integrity, the analytic section of the 
thesis will have to determine a way of making integrity measurable. With regard to 
reputation, however, Fortune‟s „Most Admired Companies‟ score provides an 
outstanding scale that has been used profitably in the literature.
76
 This section of the 
thesis will, therefore, conclude with an explanation and evaluation of the Fortune 
score. 
 
2.2.1 The Definition of Integrity and its Role as an Immaterial Asset in the 
Field of Economics 
 
The meaning of the word integrity might not be obvious at once; moreover it is 
necessary to develop an interpretation that can generate appropriate variables in the 
empirical analysis. Audi and Murphy (2006) pointed out the lack of clarity in the 
word‟s meaning either in general or in the economic context.77 The basic literature 
contains several variant definitions that will be introduced here. 
The word‟s source lies in the Latin word integritas which means authenticity or 
intactness. Commonly accepted definitions are those of Paine (1997) and Solomon 
(1992).
78
 Paine (1997) defines integrity as autonomy with respect to moral standards. 
Basically it consists of the characteristics of moral assiduousness, responsibility, 
commitment and uniformity or reliability.
79
 Solomon (1992) interprets integrity as the 
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wholeness of a person or organization
80
, and sees it as entailing not only individual 
independence and uniformity, but also loyalty, congeniality, cooperation, and 
reliability.
81
 
Another approach comes from Dalla Costa (1998), who uses integrity and honesty as 
synonyms and declares that investigations in the field of integrity only consider the 
honesty of persons or companies with regard to specific data sets.
82
 DeGeorge (1992), 
on the other hand, uses moral/ethical behavior and integrity as synonyms and adds that 
the only difference between these words is that integrity has less judgmental 
connotations than moral or ethical.
83
 In 1999 Simons developed a definition of 
integrity for company management. For him integrity represents the perceived  
concord between the values communicated outwards and those really practiced. The 
level of management integrity inside a company depends on the conformity between 
communicated and implemented values as perceived by employees.
8485
 Simons (1999)  
emphasizes that integrity can operate on different levels of abstraction. Persons as well 
as organizations such as companies can have integrity.
86
 Heres et al. (2011) define 
integrity as actions that accord with relevant moral values, norms and rules.
87
 These 
examples from the relevant literature indicate the range and diversity of current 
definitions of integrity, which constitute an initial stumbling block to any investigation 
of the impact of integrity.
88
 
Erhard et al (2009) seize on this suggestion and develop a positive model of integrity 
to solve the problem. Their solution contains the terms moral and ethical and is 
empirically verifiable.
89
 It approves Simons‟ (1999) statements insofar as integrity 
stands for concord between words and actions. Beyond this, they add that integrity is 
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possible even if one cannot keep one‟s word.90 This positive model will be explained 
in detail later. The focus will lie on the behavior of banks and companies, as banks in 
particular are the object of investigation in this thesis.
91
 Nevertheless, the explanations 
are readily transferable to personal integrity. 
Erhard et al. (2009) define integrity as the “state or condition of being whole, 
complete, unbroken, unimpaired, sound, […in] perfect condition” 92  Whether a 
company meets this definition depends on its words and statements. A company has 
integrity if its words have integrity.
93
 A company‟s word is on the one hand the 
statements of the members of the company to each other; on the other hand it is 
constituted by the statements given by the company to its stakeholders.
94
 
A company has integrity if its words have integrity, as defined by Erhard et al. (2009). 
This is the case when the company honors its word.
95
 It is reasonable to examine the 
issues and conditions that define a company‟s word and what it means in this context 
to honor one‟s word. Erhard et al. (2009) see a company‟s word as entailing six 
different issues: 
1. Statements about what will and will not be done. 
2. Knowledge about what will and will not be done. 
3. The stakeholder‟s expectations of the company. Essentially these expectations are 
unexpressed demands to the company. 
4. The company‟s statements about facts, circumstances, and so on. 
5. What a company stands for. 
6. Expectations and suggestions of the group or the state to which the company 
belongs and from whose membership it benefits. These are especially moral concepts, 
ethical ideas and governmental stipulations that determine right and wrong within a 
group or state.
96
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Corporate integrity demands, in this view, that a company‟s word has integrity in all of 
these six categories. At this point there are relations to Heres et al. (2011), who bring 
forward the argument that an organization behaves with integrity when integrity exists 
not only inside an organization, but also toward external actors, and in adherence to 
relevant moral norms and values – e.g. social rules and laws.97 
A company will be deemed to possess integrity when it honors its word, which is 
possible on the one hand by keeping and fulfilling announced promises in due time.  
On the other hand it can keep its word even if fulfillment becomes impossible. In this 
case it has to inform the aggrieved party that the promise cannot be fulfilled in due 
time as soon as this becomes evident. Furthermore, it is its duty to make a statement 
about the subsequent point of time when the promise will be fulfilled. At the same time 
it has to bear all the damage caused by inability to keep its word.
98
 
Summarizing these results so far might lead to the question why integrity plays such an 
important role for a company, or conversely why violations of integrity have a 
negative impact on the company. Erhard and Jensen explain in this context that it does 
not depend on whether misbehavior becomes public knowledge among stakeholders or 
not. They maintain that it is not merely a matter of external individuals or companies 
being affected by the company‟s violations of integrity99, because it is not the case that 
the aggrieved party‟s interests alone are violated as long as the violation does not 
become public. The authors argue that the company which acts without integrity 
always suffers from its own violations, whether these actions become public or not.
100
 
It is easier to follow the argument by if one considers the connection between integrity 
and added value postulated by Erhard et al. In their model integrity represents the 
necessary and sufficient condition for a company‟s operational readiness. Companies 
taking integrity as a guideline can achieve their desired aim. A company‟s operational 
readiness on the other hand is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
performance. Therefore a company in breach of integrity will not achieve operational 
readiness or reach maximum possible performance. Diminishing integrity on the part 
of a company is associated with a drop in maximum possible performance, and vice 
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versa. Integrity is required even if it is insufficient for long-term added value.
101
 Thus, 
integrity becomes just as important a factor for corporate productivity as, for example, 
R&D.
102
 
This new view of integrity as a positive phenomenon leads to an important new insight 
in the field of business finance. The hypothesis that long-term added value requires 
integrity inside a company can be investigated empirically. Integrity becomes an 
empirically verifiable phenomenon which can be illustrated as follows:
103
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To date only a few empirical financial studies have examined the impact of corporate 
values
104
 and individual manager abilities on company costs and/or performance.
105
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Figure 6: Integrity as an Empirically Verifiable Phenomenon 
Source: Own figure 
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This is surprising, because corporate values and manager abilities offer serious 
approaches to solving the problem of principal-agent theory expounded above.
106
 The 
conclusion of a comprehensive contract between shareholders (representing the 
principal) and manager (representing the agent) is impossible in a company due to the 
unpredictable events to which every company is subject. In a situation in which the 
agent‟s and the principal‟s aims fail to coincide, the agent can behave in an 
opportunistic way because of his superior knowledge. This opportunistic behavior 
nullifies the possibility of a first best solution and causes agency costs that lead to 
inefficiency.
107
 Inefficiency of this kind could be reduced by values like integrity.
108
 If 
the manager of a company has integrity he will not act in an opportunistic way because 
– following Erhard et al. (2009) – integrity includes the attitude not to breach the 
principal‟s expectations.109  This connection, however, requires additional empirical 
evidence.
110
 
In general it is conspicuous that empirical financial studies distinguish between the 
categories of corporate values and manager‟s characteristics. The impact of both on the 
operating result is currently being investigated. 
The literature dealing with the influence of management characteristics on financial 
performance can again be divided into two groups. The first disregards the reasons 
leading to a connection between an individual manager‟s characteristics and the 
influence of these on performance. The focus lies here on empirical evidence only.
111
 
The second approach takes the causes into consideration and presents the empirical 
results in each study as a function of transparent analysis characteristics such as the 
complexity of a CEO‟s network.112 
The studies of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Bamber et al. (2010) can be assigned to 
the first of the two categories described. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) confirm in their 
empirical analysis that a manager‟s individual characteristics influence investment and 
financial policy, as well as company strategy. Unique differences within the 
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characteristics result in variations in leadership decisions. These differences in 
leadership decisions again produce variations in a company‟s performance.113 
Bamber et al. (2010) set out to determine whether there is a connection between the 
individual characteristics of a manager and voluntary financial publications. They find 
a significant impact of a manager‟s career, age-bracket, military experience, and grade 
of degree on a company‟s voluntary publications. For example managers who have 
had military experience tend to release slightly improper information immediately, in 
contrast to those who have not had military experience.
114
 
Studies by Chevallier/Ellison (1999), Schrand/Zechmann (2012) and Engelberg (2013) 
can be classified as considering the reasons for a connection – i.e. as belonging to the 
second group mentioned above.
115
Chevallier/Ellison (1999) employ a regression 
analysis and find a significant correlation between a student‟s above average SAT 
scores
116
 acquired at the department where they took their first academic degree, and 
the risk-adjusted performance of the company.
117
 Schrand and Zechmann (2012) find a 
statistically significant negative relation between a manager‟s overconfidence and false 
information in restatements.
118
 Engelberg et al. (2013) show that managers with a 
bigger social network generate higher profits than those with a small social network.
119
 
The quintessence of all these studies is that their assumptions are no longer based on 
the neoclassical theory of a homogeneous and perfectly substitutable manager.
120
 
Studies of the determinants of a company‟s capital structure show that few differences 
can be explained by „hard‟ parameters such as market-to-book ratio, but studies of the 
impact of a manager‟s individual characteristics can close this gap.121 
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Hunton et al. (2011) and Feng et al. (2011) have analyzed the connection between 
management integrity and performance without explicitly operationalizing integrity.
122
 
Hunton et al. (2011) empirically investigated the correlation between the tone of a 
manager‟s language and business profits. The authors defined tone as the manager‟s 
attitude to implementing internal quality controls, ethical decision making, and 
meeting or outmatching the earnings hurdle rate, and they found a significant 
correlation.
123
 Feng et al. (2011) surveyed the causes of CFO‟s accounting 
manipulations, which they interpreted as violations of integrity. In their result they 
state that CFOs were not being misled into violations of integrity by compensation-
scheme-oriented incentive systems, but by pressure from the CEO.
124
 
Verschoor (1998), Donker et al. (2008) analyzed the coherence between corporate 
values and performance.
125 Verschoor‟s (1998) main result is that companies 
committing themselves to correct ethical behavior towards stakeholders demonstrate 
significantly higher financial performance than companies without such 
commitment.
126
Donker et al. (2008) examined the connection between corporate 
values in the Code of Conduct
127
 and financial performance. Like Verschoor (1998), 
this investigation again shows that corporate values boost a company‟s financial 
performance.
128
 
Other studies proceed on the basis of the findings of Erhard et al. (2009) concerning 
integrity and performance. Taking Erhard‟s (2009) definition of integrity, Dikolli et al. 
(2013) have empirically investigated the connection between CEO integrity and 
company performance.
129
 At this juncture they measure integrity by the number of 
reasoning conjunctions like "because" and "hence". This approach rests on the 
reflections of Erhard et al. (2009), who define explanations, excuses and justifications 
as a symptom for lack of behavioral integrity. Persons as well as organizations tend to 
avoid confrontation with the consequences of their behavior. Instead they contrive 
excuses for negative consequences. This is why a high level of conjunctions in a 
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CEO‟s statements can be interpreted as a low level of integrity, and vice versa.130 After 
the operationalization of integrity the focus now lies on the influence of a CEO‟s 
integrity on the quality of RAP
131
 in the balance sheet. Dikolli et al. (2013) come to the 
conclusion that there is a positive connection between CEO integrity and the quality of 
RAP.
132
 The analysis consists of 16,637 observations representing 3583 companies 
between 1988 and 2002.
133
 First the authors validate the chosen measurement of 
conjunctions by estimating the correlation of conjunctions with the stakeholder‟s 
perception of the CEO‟s integrity. An empirically significant negative correlation can 
be shown. This indicates that a rising level of conjunction use accords with a 
decreasing level of perception of the CEO‟s integrity among stakeholders.134 
Dikolli et al. (2013) could, therefore, validate their hypothesis, which prognosticated a 
correlation between the quality of RAP and the integrity of CEOs.
135
 The authors 
measure RAP quality, using appropriate models to determine expected RAP over the 
five years before each point of observation.
136
 The variable "quality of RAP" is defined 
as the standard deviation of the estimated and real RAP from t=-5 to t=-1. Thus, a high 
value variable stands for low RAP quality, because the standard deviation is high.
137
 
The correlation coefficient of RAP quality with the incidence of unexpected 
conjunctions in the shareholder report has a significant negative value. A CEO with 
low integrity is seen to use many conjunctions, and at the same time reveals low RAP 
quality.
138
 To verify the result, the authors add the control variable "CEO‟s style of 
speech"; even then they can show a significant outcome with a correlation coefficient 
of 0.088 on a 0.01 level of significance.
139
 In contrast the variable "Abilities of the 
CEO" has no influence on the measure of integrity used in this analysis.
140
 
                                                          
130
 Cf. Dikolli et al. (2013), p. 2 
131
 RAP (risk-adjusted performance) stands for place-holders between a company’s financial 
statements regarding the outlook of future cash flows. 
132
 Cf. Dikolli et al. (2013), p. 3-4. 
133
 Cf. Dikolli et al. (2013), p. 16 
134
 Cf. Dikolli et al. (2013), p. 12 
135
 Cf. Dikolli et al. (2013), p. 18 
136
 Details to the models can be found on Dikolli et al. (2013), p. 14-15. 
137
 Cf. Dikolli et al. (2013), p. 15 
138
 Cf. Dikolli et al., p. 18. 
139
 Cf. Dikolli et al. (2013), p. 19 
140
 Cf. Dikolli et al. (2013), p. 19. 
2.2 Integrity and Reputation as Intangible Assets of Banks                                                          40 
 
 
Guiso et al. (2012) test a model that investigate the connection between integrity and 
the company‟s organizational structure and performance. For this they use a sample 
from the "Great Place to Work" institute which contains information of employees 
from 679 American companies between 2007 and 2011. The authors operationalize 
integrity through the employees‟ responses to the following statements, which express 
the level of accordance with their own situation in the company: 
1. The management‟s actions match their statements. 
2. The management‟s business behavior is honest and ethically correct. 
3. You can count on the cooperation of other company employees.
141
 
The empirical tests of coherence between integrity and performance refer to a 
subsample of 385 companies listed on the stock exchange, because the necessary 
financial ratios of those companies are known.
142
 Guiso et al. (2012) use an OLS 
regression analysis with Tobin‟s Q and return on sales (ROS) as the two dependent 
variables.
143
 In the process the authors need to consider the problem of the halo effect 
which appears during the emergence of a carry-over in the process of data 
collection.
144
 In this case the halo effect becomes evident in the strong significant 
correlation of employees‟ statements concerning integrity measurements. The 
correlation coefficient of employees‟ acceptance is positive.145 The authors face the 
halo effect by implementing two control variables: employees‟ statements about job 
safety, and their sense of being able to be themselves when doing their job. These 
control variables are also affected by the halo effect, but they do not correlate with true 
company integrity.
146
 The authors can show a significant positive connection between 
employees‟ perception of management integrity and Tobin‟s Q.  
In the end the authors can confirm the positive model developed by Erhard et al. 
Regarding the coherence between integrity and a company‟s organizational structure, 
Guiso et al. (2012) find that companies listed on the stock exchange have difficulties 
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building a high level of integrity. On the other hand, companies led by the company‟s 
founder possess a higher level of integrity.
147
 
 
2.2.2 The Definition of Reputation and its Role as an Immaterial Asset in 
the Field of Economics 
The other intangible asset that plays an essential role in this thesis is the reputation of a 
company or bank.
148
 Disregarded in the past, the importance of reputation as an 
intangible asset for companies is now growing continuously; it is even occasionally 
characterized as a component of shareholder value.
149
 In general reputation stands for 
the way outsiders value a name or quality of a product, person or organization in 
public.
150
 To be more specific, a common definition of a company‟s reputation comes 
from Fombrun: "A corporate reputation is a perceptual representation of a company’s 
past action and future prospects that describes the firm’s overall appeal to all of its 
key constituents when compared with other leading rivals.
151
 Reputation can be 
established by a company by the repetition of specific actions that are linked in a 
positive way with the company in public perception.
152
 
Through its influence on product quality, strategies, and perspectives, as well as career 
prospects and other characteristics readily comparable with competing companies, a 
good reputation has an immediate effect on stakeholders
153
, enabling companies with a 
high reputation to acquire qualified employees more easily, get capital on cheaper 
conditions, and thus achieve higher product prices and lower acquisition costs.
154
 A 
high reputation also boosts trust in the quality of a company‟s products and/or services, 
and hence leads to an increase in customer loyalty.
155
 In this way it represents an 
elemental factor for sustainable competitiveness in a globalized economic world. On 
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top of that a positive reputation lowers barriers to market entry and promotes 
competitive advantages.
156
 
That reputation influences corporate financial performance
157
 has been shown by 
Dowling and Roberts (2002), who demonstrate that a high reputation creates the 
requirements for sustained high performance and profitability.
158
 Other things being 
equal, a company‟s efficiency will, in other words, increase along with its 
reputation.
159
 Investment decisions are also influenced:
160
 companies with a high 
reputation can more easily enter capital markets, thus reducing capital costs.
161
 
Anginer et al. (2011) show in their study that there is an inverse relation between a 
company‟s reputation and credit spreads of corporate bonds. An improvement in 
reputation indicates a significant reduction in capital costs.
162
 The study shows 
especially that both hard and soft information play an important role in the process of 
screening loan applicants, as well as in the determination of capital costs. The 
expression hard information stands for material values like creditworthiness, which 
represent debt redemption within the period prescribed; soft information represents e.g. 
immaterial values.
163
 Soft information cannot be documented or verified.
164
 It covers, 
for example, the lender‟s subjective appraisal concerning a manager‟s integrity and 
personality, as well as his awareness of the company‟s quality and innovative 
capacity.
165
 It follows from Anginer‟s (2011) study that reputation plays an important 
role in the process of certification, and that building and maintaining a reputation is 
consequently advantageous for companies active in capital markets.  
Due to asymmetrically incomplete financial market information, bond issuers will on 
the one hand tolerate high underwriters‟ fees, but on the other prefer to contact 
investment banks directly rather than hire underwriters who suffer from a lack of 
credibility.
166
 Companies need capital on the market, whereas underwriters evaluate 
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issuers and their projects and pass on their assessment to potential investors.
167
 A bank 
can lessen the asymmetrical incompleteness of information by mediating between the 
issuer and potential investors.
168
 But investors cannot ascertain the intensity of 
strictness with which the investment bank applies standards and scales when assessing 
investments. Hence, investors refer to the bank‟s previous performance. 169  This 
explains why investment banks are anxious to conduct accurate screening and 
monitoring, lest bad performance damage their reputation.
170
 Particularly famous 
banks are even more careful in their choice of firms as clients.
171
 
Conversely, a bad reputation has negative consequences, as issuers are guided mainly 
by an underwriter‟s reputation and prefer to choose well-established names.172 Because 
their existence as well as their future income depend on their reputation, investment 
banks take pains to be continuously active on the financial market.
173
 
Transactions made by reputable banks present trustworthy and reliable signals
174
 that 
put significant pressure on the process of certifying the quality of corporate financial 
figures, leading to the impression of a sustained development of investment income.
175
 
Conversely, companies with less well-established reputations will agree to pay higher 
fees for a reputable underwriter in order to lower the risk of a bad bond placement.
176
 
Moreover, using underwriters can reduce capital costs for the issuer.
177
 The investment 
bank‟s reputation affects the issuing price and the offer price of bonds in both equity 
and debt capital funding.
178
 Fang (2005) reveals that reputable investment banks earn 
lower credit spreads – and thus higher revenue – for their applicants in comparison 
with less reputable banks, but in exchange they demand higher fees.
179
 Nevertheless 
the net yield is cost-effective for the issuer, because the advantage of lower capital 
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costs outweighs the bank‟s higher fees.180 Besides, Andres et al. (2014) have shown 
that reputable underwriters can decrease credit spreads from high yield bonds by more 
than fifty basis points.
181
 This leads again to the finding that an issue with supported by 
a reputable investment bank is a profitable option for companies with low reputation 
and low creditworthiness. In contrast, companies with solid creditworthiness, a high 
awareness level and a long-term track record are able to attract investors for 
themselves and can therefore be active on the market directly.
182
 All in all, the 
reputation of both companies and underwriters represents an important factor with a 
significant impact on the capital market.  
 
2.2.3 The Fortune Score as a Reputation Measure 
Reputation is an intangible variable that plays an important role in the underwriting 
process of bond issues and hence also in the regression analysis conducted in this 
thesis. It is, therefore, essential at this point to explain the most common and accepted 
method used by economists to convert this intangible asset into a measurable value. 
However, before emphasizing its important role in economic theory, it is necessary to 
explain the characteristics of Fortune‟s „Most Admired Companies‟ score.  
Every year in its March edition the economic magazine Fortune creates an annual 
ranking of the "World‟s Most Admired Companies" (WMAC). Subdivided into 
different industries, it is based on the two rankings "Fortune 1000" and "Fortune 
Global 500". These refer to the 1000 companies with the highest sales in America and 
the 500 with the highest sales in the world. The score is established through a survey 
conducted every year in October, in which executive managers, directors and analysts 
evaluate companies in their industry on the basis of nine criteria, each of which is 
classified on an eleven point scale. Zero points stand for bad and ten for excellent.
183
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The criteria are: 
(1) The ability to acquire, evolve and keep talented employees 
(2) Quality of management 
(3) Social responsibility to society and the economy 
(4) Innovative capacity 
(5) Quality of products and services 
(6) Effective use of assets 
(7) Financial balance 
(8) Long-term investment value 
(9) Effectiveness in the accomplishment of global transactions.
184
 
The resultant „reputation score‟ corresponds with the average of all the assessments 
across these nine criteria. The score determines a company‟s ranking within its 
industry e.g. computing, metal-working, banking or telecommunications.
185
 One 
condition needs to be fulfilled: to be included in the ranking a company‟s reputation 
score must be at least among the top 50%.
186
 
In addition to these lists, Fortune publishes a second so called All Star List as a survey 
of the fifty most admired companies.
187
 This ranking is developed by another poll in 
which the same group specifies its personal ten top companies outside its own 
industry.
188
 And apart from the WMAC ranking (published annually since 1997), 
another evaluation covers "America‟s Most Admired Companies" (AMAC). Published 
since 1983, it uses eight criteria; the ninth one drops out.
189
 
Having clarified the method behind the Fortune score and its cognates, the economic 
relevance of these scales of measurement must now be addressed. Cao et al. use the 
AMAC ranking to show that companies announcing a restatement exhibit a 
significantly higher chance not to enter the Fortune ranking in the following five years 
than those without a restatement.
190
Fortune rankings have the advantage of an 
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extensive control sample involving assessments by thousands of experts,
191
 who are 
thereby implicitly acknowledged as possessing expert knowledge of the product 
market as well as of management abilities.
192
 Moreover, the evaluation has outstanding 
consistency due to its 30 year existence, which makes long-term studies possible.
193
 
Its widespread acknowledgment by economists is a good indication of the significance 
of the Fortune score as a reputation measure. An overview has been placed in the 
annex to provide a comprehensive analytic list of studies using the Fortune score to 
date.  
From this it becomes evident that the first studies implementing the score were made 
in 1986. Since the present research was undertaken in 2013, a period of 28 years has 
elapsed in which the Fortune score has played an important role in economics. During 
these 28 years 52 studies have been published in widely diverse journals investigating 
the impact of reputation on various issues. Only three of these studies found no 
significant relation between reputation and the investigated issues: nearly all agree that 
a high reputation has positive effects, whether due to decreasing costs or higher 
performance. Nevertheless a disadvantage of the Fortune score is indicated in some 
studies,
194
 whose authors impute that contributors to the survey are influenced by a 
company‟s past financial success. All in all, however, the Fortune score is an accepted 
and frequently used measure of reputation.
195
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2.3 The impact of bond issues on a company‟s capital costs and 
performance 
Corporate bonds can be understood as a contract in which the issuing company 
promises to make interest and redemption payments at a predefined future date or 
dates. In return it receives cash now.
196
 Companies can commission investment banks 
or underwriters to issue bonds on the market, where investors can buy them.
197
 It is not 
absolutely necessary to appoint an underwriter, but companies prefer to make use of an 
underwriter in markets with high information asymmetry.
198
 It is possible to appoint 
one or several underwriters, but fees must be paid for each.
199
 The underwriting fee 
represents the underwriter‟s compensation for the risk assumption connected with the 
issuing process.
200
 
The following diagram gives an overview of the process of bond issues, with its 
various participants and roles: 
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Figure 7: The Process of Corporate Bond Certification 
Source: Own figure 
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The value of corporate bonds depends on three basic components. First, the structure 
of the period of validity, second, the call options included with the bond, and third, the 
credit (or default) risk. Risk is part of the process, because companies might not be 
able to perform their obligations in full and at the promised time.
201
 This default risk 
was in the past the main criterion distinguishing corporate from government bonds, but 
the current financial crisis has changed this situation in several countries. Today not all 
government bonds can be declared riskless any more.
202
 
In general, corporate bonds bear higher risk than government bonds, so investors 
expect a higher return; this is called the credit spread. Thus, the level of credit spread 
correlates with the level of risk. The credit spread itself depends on multiple factors. A 
company can issue different bonds with different individual spreads.
203
 The credit 
spread can be described as the difference between the return on maturity date of a 
corporate bond and a government bond with the same period of validity.
204
 According 
to Elton et al. (2001), the difference can be traced back to three factors: (a) expected 
default risk, (b) tax rate, and (c) risk rate.
205
 These will now be considered in that 
order. 
(a) Some bond repayments will default with a specific probability. Hence, investors 
expect a higher predetermined redemption payment to compensate the default risk. The 
latter depends among other things on the rating of each company. The difference 
between the underwriter‟s advertised price and the price currently being paid on the 
capital market is called underwriter gross spread.
206
 This contains a management fee, 
an underwriting fee, a sales commission, and further relationship-specific underwriting 
fees.
207
 In addition, the level of the fee depends on the default risk, the period of 
validity, the volume of the bond issue, and the underwriter‟s reputation; 208  it is 
calculated as the quotient of the underwriter‟s financial compensation and the issue 
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volume.
209
 The so called gross spread stands for the underwriter gross spread 
expressed in percentage.
210
 Elton et al. (2001) investigate AA, A and BBB bonds with 
periods of validity of between two and ten years.
211
 In their result they show that in 
general the spread is higher in the financial than in the industrial sector. Furthermore, 
the spread is higher for both sectors in cases of low ratings.
212
 
However the marginal probability of default increases for the high-rated debt and 
decreases for low-rated debt. This occurs because bonds can change their rating during 
the period of their term. For example a bond rated by Standard & Poor‟s as AAA may 
in the following year show a default risk of zero, whereas the probability after twenty 
years may rise 0.206%. The other extreme is a bond rated as CCC which in the 
following year shows a default risk of 22.052%. In this case the probability of default 
will decrease over twenty years to 2.928%.
213
 
Credit rating agencies have information about companies which are not public, so in 
their bond ratings they can inform investors about the credibility of the respective 
debtor.
214
 In general bond ratings are assigned to bonds at the time of issue and 
verified onward by credit rating agencies.
215
 A change in rating indicates that the 
debtor‟s creditworthiness has improved or deteriorated.216 Standard & Poor ratings of 
BBB- or better are valued as investment grade, whereas bonds with a lower rating are 
called high yield or junk bonds and are valued as non-investment grade.
217
 These 
relatively risky bonds are generally characterized by high returns, intended to 
incentivize investors and at the same time compensate them for the high risk connected 
with the bonds.
218
 Since from the company‟s point of view bonds represent debt, a 
rating downgrade leads to higher capital costs and vice versa.
219
 Hence, companies 
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with poor credibility or credit history can profit from the services of a financial 
intermediary.
220
 
(b) Interest on corporate bonds is generally taxable at a rate of 5-10% in the U.S., whereas 
interest on government bonds is free of tax. Hence, investors seek compensation in the 
form of a tax rebate.
221
 
(c) As the return on corporate bonds is riskier than for government bonds, investors should 
receive a risk rate as well as interest. This is the case because a huge part of the risk is 
systematic and therefore impossible to diversify. However, this aspect is disputed in 
the literature.
222
 Despite the work of Elton et al. (2001), 46.17% of the spread remains 
unexplained.
223
 
An approach to the analysis of this unexplained element is to examine the impact of 
immaterial values. Anginer et al. (2011) criticize the literature‟s excessive focus on 
„hard facts‟ – i.e. information that can be easily documented, such as the progress of a 
company‟s repayments. Soft facts, representing the opposite of hard, are often 
disregarded because they are difficult to evaluate and frequently subjective. It may 
well, therefore, be appropriate to explore the impact of „soft facts‟ more intensively – 
as Anginer et al. (2011) emphasize in their study of the influence of reputation on 
credit costs.
224
 Their results show that reputation influences credit costs not only 
statistically but also economically. They indicate that a rise in Fortunes reputation 
ranking leads to a reduction in credit costs.
225
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3. Empirical Evidence of Economic Effects due 
to Misbehavior 
 
This chapter outlines the economic role played by the variables to be applied in the 
later empirical analysis. This field of research is as yet quite unexplored: none of these 
variables has, to the author‟s knowledge, been used previously to determine behavior 
lacking in integrity. In fact, most research has a slightly different approach, focusing 
not on integrity but on variables connected with compliance violation. Chapter 3 will 
summarize the current state of research in order to develop new hypotheses. In each 
section an explanation of the term will be followed by relevant empirical evidence. As 
the use of some of these variables is new, limited case studies will replace empirical 
evidence to show the existence of the violations concerned. 
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3.1 Restatements 
 
The most important regulations for capital-market-oriented companies operating in the 
U.S. market are the International Accounting Standards IFRS and US-GAAP.
226
 The 
financial information provided by the accounting standards is intended to reduce the 
information gap between entrepreneurs and the financial market; it is also generally 
used to inform outsiders about a company‟s ownership, and its financial and earnings 
position.
227
 Hence, financial statements represent an important source of information 
for both investors and financial analysts, whose forecasts are based on an evaluation of 
a company‟s economic situation.228 
Ball and Brown (1968) stress the value of financial accounting, and Beaver (1968) 
shows that financial ratios are an early indicator of a company‟s possible default.229 
This information is also used for monitoring.
230
 Chen et al. (2012) assign auditors great 
influence in the process of controlling annual reports, because they can reduce a 
manager‟s opportunistic projections, and as an external control mechanism they 
represent a per se credible function.
231
 In this respect Gaa (2007) emphasizes the need 
for independent auditors to behave with integrity, in order to protect shareholders‟ 
interests.
232
 
If financial statements are published by a company and in the course of time are 
corrected and republished due to mistakes which may lead outsiders to draw false 
conclusions, this is called a financial restatement.
233
 Some of these corrections may be 
voluntary, others may result from the instructions of auditors and regulatory 
authorities.
234
 The American Securities Act requires companies to correct incorrect, 
incomplete or misleading reports.
235
 A company may discover misreporting or 
misstatements (i.e. faulty descriptions of their accounting ratios) in the process of 
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internal audit or other internal control procedures.
236
 On the other hand, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) or independent auditors can induce rectification of 
faulty entrepreneurial documents identified through inspection.
237
 Announcement of 
such rectifications takes place in one or more press releases by the affected company, 
or by submission of what is known as „Form 8-K‟.238 Depending on the period of the 
corrected financial reports, capital-market-oriented companies might have to complete 
a modification of „Form 10-Q‟ or „Form 10-K‟.239 
There are many different reasons for restatements e.g. a typing error can happen, or a 
specific accounting standard may be overlooked, either of which can lead to wrong 
balance sheet figures followed by incorrect accounting. Moreover the implementation 
of a new accounting method within a company may make it necessary to revise 
previous balance sheets and adjust them to new regulations.
240
 The restatement may, in 
fact, lead to a better result than the original announcement, though in most cases the 
opposite is more likely and the financial situation of the company turns out to be worse 
than expected.
241
 
In the context of restatements two types of misreporting can be distinguished. 
Accounting errors are said to be made unintentionally in the processing of transactions 
or in the application of accounting standards, with the result that the financial 
statements no longer conform to US-GAAP.
242
 Financial reporting fraud, however, 
entails the intention to fake balance sheets or to intentionally implement accounting 
standards wrongly.
243
 In most cases these actions are performed to achieve a better 
external presentation of the company‟s economic situation than is actually the case. A 
characteristic of these companies is their large financial leverage, aimed at reducing 
external financing costs.
244
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The announcement of a restatement generally signals that previous annual reports 
include mistakes and are therefore unreliable.
245
 Although it may often be just one 
specific part of the balance sheet that has to be corrected, the whole balance sheet – 
and with it the company‟s entire performance – is automatically subjected to doubt. 
Mistakes of this kind increase the information gap between creditor and borrower 
246
 
and undermine investors‟ confidence in a company‟s accuracy.247 
Moreover, restatements motivate outsiders to scrutinize the quality and accuracy of 
company announcements, which may still further diminish credibility.
248
 The impact 
of restatements depends on the gravity of their cause. Restatements due to fraudulent 
financial reporting will clearly be more detrimental, as they will be discussed in public 
and will almost certainly have a negative effect on a company‟s reputation.249 
Especially for companies listed on the stock exchange, restatements may have long-
term consequences. For example, market capitalization may be influenced negatively, 
because market reaction to announcements in which previous financial statements had 
to be adjusted is very sensitive.
250
 Predictably, the strongest negative market reaction is 
found after restatements that unequivocally rectify a company‟s earnings 
downwards.
251
 Hribar and Jenkins (2004) show that the relative increase in capital 
costs in the month following a restatement lies between 7% and 19%, depending on 
the method of valuation. Restatements initiated by auditors trigger the highest increase 
in capital costs,
252
 and companies with high leverage in their debt likewise show higher 
increase than others,
253
 because investors demand higher yields. The demand is 
justified by the uncertainty about the management‟s credibility and authority, as well 
as the investor‟s perception of the company‟s economic situation.254 
Palmrose et al. (2004) analyzed restatements and resultant market reactions and 
established that the average abnormal return in a time slot of two days after the 
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announcement of a restatement decreases. The negative return was even higher in 
cases in which fraud was involved, more than one mistake was admitted, or profits had 
to be reduced.
255
 The significant downgrade in earnings forecast by financial analysts 
after a restatement carried considerable weight.
256
 
Anderson and Yohn (2002) showed that corrections in revenue recognition caused the 
highest spread in the stock market, and that their impact on investors‟ perceptions of 
corporate value, as well as on the information gap, was even higher than that caused by 
restatements concerning other financial data.
257
 The results of these empirical studies 
emphasize the important role of restatements for a company, characterized as these are 
by substantial loss in shareholder value on the one hand, and by growth in capital costs 
on the other.
258
 
In the process of borrowing, which represents a primary type of business financing, the 
cost of capital can also rise.
259
 Graham et al. (2008) point out that contracts closed 
after a restatement are typified by significantly higher spreads, shorter periods of 
validity, and stricter contract terms than credits concluded before misreporting.
260
 
Companies affected also have to pay higher commissions and fees, and the number of 
lenders decreases after a restatement.
261
 The different impacts can be easily explained: 
a restatement constitutes incorrect information given to lenders. The correction of a 
balance sheet in the form of a downgrade is a sign that the company‟s financial 
management is worse than previously supposed.
262
 This is followed by a stricter 
reappraisal of the credit risk, declining credibility, and higher default risk.
263
 
Moreover, restatements can cause higher costs in the form of underwriter fees in the 
process of bond issue.
264
 Wang et al. (2013) show that the quality of restatements also 
influences a company‟s capital costs because investment banks consider previous 
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restatements both in setting up an underwriting contract and in the corresponding 
negotiations.
265
 
Since the risk of cooperating with a company that has had an instance of misreporting 
in the past is higher for the investment bank, their expenditure for the due diligence 
process is also higher. If investors are deceived, the consequences affect both issuer 
and underwriter.
266
 Moreover, the demand for bonds is lower among companies with a 
history of misreporting, leading to a higher risk in the liquidity of these bonds, as well 
as higher marketing expenditure.
267
 The impact on underwriter fees is higher during 
the years immediately following a restatement, and it generally decreases with 
improvements made in the field of corporate governance.
268
 In contrast, companies 
that intentionally published fake reports have a higher probability of default.
269
 
Additional studies have investigated the connection between integrity and 
restatements. Cao et al. (2012) explore the connection between the quality of annual 
reports and corporate reputation.
270
 Restatements have been observed mainly in 
companies that introduce a shareholding component into their compensation for the 
CEO (Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Efendi et al. (2007)).
271
 
 
3.2 Money laundering 
 
Given the variety of different types of money laundering, it is difficult to choose one 
specific definition. It makes sense to focus on an explanation of the term with an 
international relevance, for instance the definition set by the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) of the OECD. The principle of money laundering is to channel earnings 
from criminal activities into the business cycle with the aim of covering the source 
tracks and legalizing the illegally acquired funds. The main sources of income in this 
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sector are arms trade, drug distribution, human trafficking, smuggling, and 
prostitution, joined by beguilement, burglary and corruption.
272
 
The following image illustrates the methodology of money laundering and its relevant 
stages. First the illegal earnings have to be transferred into the legal financial system 
by changing it into foreign currencies or assets such as gold. This step is followed by 
deposits into domestic or foreign accounts. Permanent assignments of varying amounts 
to accounts distributed among various states, people and companies create the intended 
camouflage. These earnings are then justified by false documents: e.g. bills, 
certificates, contracts, loans, lottery prizes, company shares and investments in real 
estate. Finally the laundered money is invested in consumer goods and property to gain 
private advantage.
273
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Figure 8: Explicit stages of the money-laundering process 
Based on: Handbuch "Geldwäsche" für den Innen- und Außendienst der Steuerverwaltung, Zentrum für Steuerpolitik und Verwaltung, OECD (Source: Berk/DeMarzo 2013, p.170). 
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In 2009 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime performed a statistical analysis 
to investigate the complex of problems related to money laundering. They discovered 
that the sums concerned amounted to “[...] around $1.6 trillion or 2.7 per cent of global 
GDP [...] This figure is consistent with the 2 to 5 per cent range previously established 
by the International Monetary Fund to estimate the scale of money laundering.”274 This 
data indicates the globally important role of money laundering. 
The following diagram illustrates the different public authorities that work on national, 
supranational and international levels with the aim of preventing and penalizing money 
laundering: 
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Figure 9: Different levels of authorities dealing with money laundering 
Source: Own figure 
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Founded in 1989 by the G7 states to suppress terrorism and money laundering, FATF 
operates throughout the territory of the OECD .
275
 Today it is one of the most 
important authorities worldwide.
276
 Its relevance is characterized by the fact that it 
includes 36 member states covering the most important financial centers of Asia, 
Europe and North  and South America. Non-cooperating states are being gradually 
integrated into the work of FATF to increase pressure on them. States known to be 
high risk, which have not yet implemented international standards to combat money 
laundering, are blacklisted as described in detail below. This applies to states that fail 
to implement the more than 40 directives (supplemented by 9 more after 9/11) to fight 
terrorism and save the financial system. Developing countries in particular are 
included in this system.
277
 
FATF established the Financial Intelligence Units,
278
 whose function is to detect and 
analyze money laundering worldwide. Germany‟s legislation in this area is embodied 
in its Money Laundering Act (Geldwäschegesetz: GWG), whose §10 addresses the 
solution of money laundering cases.
279
 In close cooperation with FATF, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has developed better international regulations on 
money laundering,
280
 which have been approved by the World Bank and added to 
national codes of legislation.
281
 
Cases of international money laundering are documented by the UNODC – an 
international unit fighting drugs and crime that supports member states in the 
implementation of regulations against money laundering, as well as with software to 
reduce the crime rate.
282
 Interpol is yet another institution that supports international 
investigations with the exchange of data and the prosecution of money laundering.
283
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The American standards were established by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.
284
 This 
was followed by the Money Laundering Control Act in 1986 and the USA PATRIOT 
Act as a consequence of the terrorist attacks of 2001. These were the most important 
laws aimed at countering terrorism and controlling bank customers‟ transactions .285 
The EU has supported the implementation of anti-money-laundering standards in 
collaboration with FATF by setting up 40 recommendations.
286
 In June 1991, in 
response to international pressure, the Council of the European Community issued an 
initial 
287
 “directive […] to prevent the use of the financial system for money 
laundering No. 91/308/EEC”288 Laws against money laundering – addressed not only 
to banks but also to financial service institutions and insurance companies – followed 
in due course.
289
 
The directive was implemented in Germany in 1992 by the introduction of the “law to 
fight illegal trade in drugs and other types of organized crime” (OrgKG in §261 StGB), 
which in turn became the foundation of the German money laundering law (GWG).
290
  
The area of application was extended in 2001 and 2005 to specific professional groups 
including insurance intermediaries, legal professions and some classes of industrial 
retailer.
291
 The main focus however lies on the financial sector, companies and banks. 
In line with GWG §16 clause 2 no. 2 the Federal Financial Services Agency (BaFin) 
supervises preventive measures in this area.
292
 This act empowers BaFin to control 
credit companies, financial service companies, payment institutions (especially life 
policy companies), capital investment companies, and people and companies selling or 
trading electronic money. These duties are regulated by the Money Laundering Act 
                                                          
284
 Cf. http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/aml_history.html 
285
 Cf. http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/aml_history.html 
286
 Cf. Mitsilegas and Gilmore (2007), p. 120 
287
 Cf. Lang (2001), p. 11 
288
 Cited by Lang from EG L 166/77 
289
 Cf. 
http://www.bafin.de/DE/Aufsicht/Geldwaeschebekaempfung/geldwaeschebekaempfung_node.html 
290
 Cf. Lang (2001), p. 1 
291
 Cf. 
http://www.bafin.de/DE/Aufsicht/Geldwaeschebekaempfung/geldwaeschebekaempfung_node.html 
292
 Cf. http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gwg_2008/gesamt.pdf 
3.2 Money laundering                                                                                                                           63 
 
 
(GWG), Credit Act (KWG), Insurance Supervision Act (VAG), Payment Supervision 
Act  (ZAG), and Investment Act (InvG).
293
 
It is BaFin‟s intention to prevent not only the abuse of the financial sector but also the 
funding of terrorism.
294
 Beyond this, the organization aims to create transparency in 
business relationships and financial transactions, and to safeguard customer care.
295
 
The same principles govern the 2001 regulations of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision regarding a “bank‟s duty of care in the legitimate concerns of its 
customers”. Especially with the aim of preventing abuses, the committee declares the 
measures of the worldwide banking system in connection with the identification of 
customers to be necessary in the light of adequate risk management for banks.
296
 The 
Basel Committee explicitly considers the risks of reputation loss and states that 
investors, trustees and the market should have a high degree of confidence in banks. 
The risk of negative publicity in the wake of reputation loss, no matter if it is based on 
truth or lies, is defined as affecting confidence in an institute‟s integrity.297 
BaFin‟s homepage states similarly that companies in the financial sector should avoid 
transactions with a criminal background. Emphasis is laid on processes of money 
laundering and financing terrorism, as well as other criminal actions leading to the 
compromise of an institute‟s propriety. These can threaten an abused company‟s 
reputation and solidity and, beyond this, endanger the integrity and stability of the 
whole financial sector.
298
 
The last-mentioned passages make it clear that awareness of immaterial assets such as 
integrity and reputation, and their connection with a company‟s value, has risen. 
Money laundering represents a high risk factor, since it systematically misuses the 
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banking industry for illegal causes and activities. Hence, a properly functioning 
identification procedure is necessary to increase the alertness of financial institutes.
299
 
The following paragraphs cite empirical evidence of money laundering, illustrating its 
importance as a variable in the empirical section of the thesis. According to Sharman 
(2008) there were no laws or directives on money laundering two decades ago. Today 
more than 170 countries have passed legislation or issued directives in this matter.
300
 
Verhage (2009) lists national monetary volumes, inflation rates, interest-fees and 
exchange rates as factors influenced by cash flows of laundered money. Causing 
immense damage to the economy, these cash flows complicate every central bank‟s 
aim to establish a balanced financial system based on adequate monetary policies. 
Verhage (2009) goes on to observe that in this context economies not directly affected 
by money laundering also feel its negative impacts through interactions on the 
international markets that lead to unfair conditions of competition.
301
 
Masciandaro (1999) adds another consequence: the high costs caused by efforts to 
control and combat money laundering. The special software needed for the 
investigation of transactions generates considerable costs. Depending on the grade of 
efficiency, compliance with regulations also inevitably causes costs.
302
 
Johnson and Lim (2002) investigate whether countries belonging to FATF have better 
anti-money-laundering policies, and whether membership of FATF influences the 
relation between money laundering policy and relevant banking standards.
303
 They 
conclude that most countries achieve a better relation after joining FATF.
304
 
Bartlett (2002) thematizes in particular the damage to the financial systems of 
developing countries. Money laundering undermines the financial systems in three 
different ways: first it raises the possibility that individual customers are betrayed by 
corrupt bank employees. Secondly the rate of criminal wheeling and dealing inside the 
banks rises. Thirdly financial institutes themselves suffer financial damage.
305
 Thus, 
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Bartlett (2002) points out the operational risk as well as the crucial reputation risk in 
terms of loss of trust in the integrity of the institute concerned.
306
 
Sharman (2008) investigates the impact of anti-money-laundering laws in the context 
of developing countries. He concludes that these laws are implemented 
indiscriminately and under pressure,
307
 and that FATF‟s blacklisting systems (see 
above) have already caused considerable damage to reputations, inasmuch as these 
countries are being avoided intensively.
308
 
Harvey and Lau (2009) investigate compliance activities conducted by banks to 
counter money laundering. They look at these in connection with the bank‟s annual 
reports
309
 and conclude that banks that remain silent about their anti-money-laundering 
compliance harm themselves because they ignore the large additional payments this 
may cost them, as well as the lost opportunity to raise their reputation.
310
 
Verhage (2009) focuses his research on banks that had been used for money 
laundering before enduring a loss of reputation. The loss in reputation caused by 
money laundering leads to a loss of trust in the banks themselves, in addition to 
immediate pecuniary damage. Banks therefore have a strong vested interest – in such 
cases rooted in bitter experience – in complying with legal standards and intra-
company behavioral codes. Strict adherence to money laundering regulations can be 
interpreted as a signal to the market and eventually functions as a marketing tool, with 
the consequence that the loss of reputation ends up creating leverage.
311
 
As can be seen from this overview, a number of studies investigate the relation 
between money laundering and the financial system; none, however, investigates the 
impact of money laundering on intangible assets such as reputation, integrity, or the 
shareholder value that derives from them. 
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3.3 Settlement payments 
 
In the case of an accusation against a company or bank, the accused will often prefer to 
make a settlement payment, especially if serious – or even fatal – consequences must 
be feared from a prosecution. An out of court agreement has several benefits. It 
definitely shortens the period in which the accused party is mentioned in the media, 
suffering continuous damage to its reputation. Moreover, the punishment, whether 
monetary or penal in other ways, will generally be cheaper or might even be avoided. 
Nevertheless a fulfilled settlement payment always produces the feeling of a 
confession towards the accuser.   
Since no research literature has so far investigated settlement payments, their 
significance and impact can be illustrated by a recent incident involving HSBC, one of 
the world‟s biggest banks. In 2012 the bank was confronted with the allegation of 
having practiced and supported drug distribution between 2004 and 2010.
312
 Between 
2007 and 2008 HSBC Mexico is said to have transferred $7 billion dollars to HSBC 
USA. Even more billions are said to have been lodged in Iranian banks.
313
  HSBC was 
on the verge of being punished with a fine of several billion dollars and by the removal 
of its operating license.
314
 
The bank‟s reaction was to confess its misdemeanors and announce to its employees 
that responsibility had to be taken for the „mistakes‟.315 The North American head of 
HSBC apologized in public and declared that the resultant deficits would be made 
good.
316
 In 2012, to buy its way out of the misery, HSBC made a settlement payment 
of $1.9 billion, the highest penalty imposed on a bank to date. In addition, the bank had 
to improve its internal controlling, which cost a further $700 million. Nevertheless its 
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benefit from the money laundering still by far exceeds the penalty.
317
 Writing in the 
New York Times, the public authorities gave two reasons why the penalty was not even 
higher: to avoid weakening the financial system and deterring investors.
318
 
The scandalizing news had little impact on the equity price of HSBC shares. Given the 
penalty, investors were clearly not disturbed by the confession of guilt. It seems the 
opposite was the case, for on announcement of the fine the share lost a little in price, 
but it has subsequently risen by 14%.
319
 The case illustrates succinctly how settlement 
payments can be used to avoid the more serious consequences that can arise from an 
allegation.  
 
3.4 Corruption and bribery 
 
Since the terms corruption and bribery stand for a type of offense, it is wise to 
remember the characteristics of the Codes of Conduct as explained in the Introduction 
to this thesis. A short overview of German practice will be given here before turning to 
the American approach to these matters. 
In Germany, the importance of compliance finally came home to the minds of 
managers, politicians and the general public after the publication of the German 
Corporate Governance Code (DCGK) in 2002.
320
 
In this context, compliance indicates behavior in accordance with the law.
321
 The 
incidence of public scandals in German business prior to 2002 highlighted the 
importance of corporate governance and compliance not just in the banking sector but 
across the board.
322
  Although, as a set of recommendations, the Code represents a soft 
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law, compliance has advanced to the rank of a key management task affecting the trust 
of both the customer and the financial market.
323
 
Binding on each employee, compliance recommendations represent a raft of 
commitments based on external, legal specifications and intra-company rules.
324
 The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), passed in the U.S. also in 2002, was motivated by a series 
of bank scandals. As the most important law in the field of compliance, it regulates 
both commitments and direct measures aimed to avoid irregular behavior.
325
 
Compliance violations can be classed as infidelity, fraud, disregard of the Federal Data 
Protection Act, and more serious illegal activities culminating in corruption and 
bribery. It is difficult to calculate the long-term risk and damage which these latter 
cause for companies and the economy.
326
 
Probably the most famous example of corruption and bribery was the case of Enron in 
2001, which led to the collapse of one of the biggest companies in the energy sector 
and the loss of thousands of jobs and billions of shareholder dollars. Since then Enron 
has stood as a notorious example of the consequences of greed and corruption for the 
national and global economy.
327
 
In recent years the effects of compliance violations have taken center stage in the 
press, yet the topic has been little researched.
328
 Some empirical studies show that 
corruption has negative consequences on economic stability: as well as its negative 
impact on the investment rate, employment rate, and growth rate of a country, and the 
concomitant reduction in GDP, corrupt behavior especially threatens the stability of 
the financial system.
329
 Nevertheless it is often regarded as a necessary evil for initial 
business contact: the World Bank estimates that each year $1 trillion is paid in bribes. 
Especially the banking sector is accused of doing little to combat corruption.
330
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Cheung et al. (2012) have investigated the impact of corruption on company value. 
They show that $1 paid as a bribe leads to an $11 increase in company value, but at the 
same time to fines and settlement payments,
331
 and to other risks that are difficult to 
calculate but mainly show up as serious damage to reputation.
332
 The loss of credibility 
and public trust ultimately weighs more than any measurable financial loss.
333
 A study 
of business crime conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) in 2009 showed that 
44% of all companies suffer from serious reputation loss caused by criminal 
activity,
334
 of which a substantial proportion can be ascribed to corruption. 
Besides its effect on a company‟s immaterial value, corruption has a direct impact on 
business financing. Investigating the impact of the announcement of bribes on the 
financial market, Smith et al. (1983) established a negative reaction in share prices that 
was directly related to the level of bribery payments. Their investigation supported the 
theory that the announcement of corrupt practices undermines a company‟s share price 
because a turbulent future is henceforth predicted for the company.
335
 Hamilton and 
Rao (1996) agreed with this assumption in their study. They investigated 58 cases 
between 1989 and 1993 in the U.S., including those of bribery, and showed that an 
negative abnormal return arises monthly in the wake of such an announcement.
336
 
Karpoff et al. (2009) demonstrated that bribes lead not only to a negative reaction in 
share value but to significant costs for the company as well. They found that on the 
day of the announcement of corrupt behavior the shareholder value declined. Focusing 
on the whole period from the announcement of the bribery to the point when counter-
measures took effect, a decrease in shareholder value could be seen. Compared with a 
company that had not shown corrupt behavior of any kind, the average cost of equity 
rose.
337
 
Fan et al. (2008) studied the impact of corrupt behavior on a company‟s capital 
structure. In this context the ratio of debt to equity is crucial for the rating of 
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internationally operating companies. In this respect the payment of bribes can lead to a 
wrong classification. Fan proved that the debt ratio of corrupt companies decreased in 
comparison to companies acting in compliance, and in particular that long-term debt 
decreased. The investigation revealed a financial advantage that remained as long as 
the corrupt link between two parties existed. This advantage faded as soon as the 
corruption was revealed. Along with this investigation Fan et al. examined whether the 
fading advantage had an influence on shareholder value. Results indicated that the 
value of the company decreased in the wake of stock market reaction.
338
 
Summary: All the results lead to the conclusion that compliance violations, 
characterized by the discovery of corruption or bribery, on the one hand impact the 
financial market, and on the other hand lead to a loss of reputation. Diminishing 
credibility in the company results in a loss of trust. When it comes to the cause of 
corruption and bribery, Lasthuizen et al. (2011) see this as lack of integrity, a condition 
which the resultant criminal activities inevitably further exacerbate.
339
 
 
3.5 Class-action lawsuits 
 
Since little has been written on class-action lawsuits in the relevant literature, this 
section will be completed with a brief case study. In class action lawsuits one or more 
parties sue representatively for a number of other parties, or several plaintiffs sue 
several similarly acting companies.
340
 The number of plaintiffs varies from a low 
double-digit number up to millions.
341
 Loughran et al. (2007) inspected 10,000 annual 
reports between 1994 and 2006 with a focus on terms and expressions related to 
ethics.
342
 They found that especially companies suffering from class-action lawsuits, as 
well as from bad corporate governance, used such expressions in their annual 
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reports.
343
 The authors evaluated these findings as a lack of integrity, in line with the 
definition of Erhard et al. (2009).
344
 
 
Billings et al. (2012) cite shareholder class-action lawsuits to illustrate how the 
literature focuses on the influence of compliance cases on shareholder earnings.
345
 
They show that close to the date of submission of a shareholders‟ class-action lawsuit 
the defendant‟s bond earnings decrease significantly and the corresponding trade 
volume increases.
346
 Vermeulen and Zetsche (2010) show that shareholder class-action 
lawsuits are generally used improperly and have a negative impact on the company 
concerned.
347
 
In the current lawsuit between Dandong and Pinnacle Performance Ltd., several 
investors from Singapore are claiming the status of a class-action law suit.
348
 The main 
accusation against the parent company, Morgan Stanley, is that the Synthetic 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) had to fail because of the way they were 
constructed.
349
 On top of that Morgan Stanley took money out of these deals.
350
 Class-
action lawsuits are generally time and cost intensive and harm the defendant‟s 
reputation.
351
 This is why settlements out of court are favored.
352
 Considering the fact 
that the process has been running as an individual suit since October 2010, an 
agreement out of court, including a settlement payment, may well come soon.
353
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3.6 Misuse, embezzlement and misappropriation 
Cases of misuse in the banking sector are often connected with insider information. A 
recent example is the U.S. bank Goldman Sachs.
354
 A former director of the bank, 
Rajat Gupta, was sentenced to two years imprisonment on October 24, 2012 for giving 
insider information to the hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam four years earlier.
355
  In 
2012 two further employees of Goldman Sachs working in the Taiwan office were 
under suspicion of passing on insider information.
356
 After his conviction Gupta said 
he had lost a reputation he had spent years building.
357
 
Cases of embezzlement may be a consequence of poor internal controls in a company. 
The British Standard Chartered Bank in Taiwan had to pay a fine of $168,500 because 
its internal controlling had failed to detect a misappropriation of client funds in 
connection with credit cards in time.
358
 The assumption that in cases of bad internal 
control systems other control devices such as screening will not function satisfactorily 
is self-evident.
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4 Hypotheses and Variables 
 
This chapter is based on the previous chapters. Chapter 2 explained the problem that 
occurs when separating ownership and control, as well as the theoretical background 
of immaterial values like reputation and integrity. After the explanation of the process 
of certification, which serves for a better understanding of the development of this 
thesis, Chapter 3 formulated the current state of research regarding the impacts of 
misbehavior on performance and costs of corporate misbehavior.  
Six hypotheses will now be formulated to check whether a bank‟s integrity and 
reputation have an impact on costs and performance in the process of certification. The 
following step will explain the approach of this thesis in creating new variables for 
integrity, as well as the application of the Fortune Most Admired Score.
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4.1 Development of the hypotheses 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the impact of underwriters‟ integrity and 
reputation on companies and investors in the bond market. Trust in underwriters is 
very important for companies, because they need their services to issue bonds in the 
market, as well as for investors, who act as buyers in the market and take the risk of 
financial loss. In the following empirical part of this thesis the point of view of both 
parties is, therefore, relevant, and checks will be made for a significant connection to 
integrity and reputation.  
The first step is to analyze the impact on corporate bond performance. If more than one 
lead underwriter acts, the total number of underwriters will be termed a syndicate in 
the sense of Andres et al. (2014).
359
 The pool of data accessed here contains cases of 
bond issues arranged by up to five underwriters. 
According to Andres et al. (2014) and the literature quoted there, investment banks, in 
their function as lead underwriters, have the elemental duty of screening, which means 
that they have to select those companies whose bond issues they recommend and those 
they reject. Hence the lead underwriter will choose the issuer and analyze the bonds on 
offer.
360
 In the process of certification, each bank defines its own underwriting 
standards, and due to their diversity they play an important role in the screening 
process. Banks that pursue high underwriting standards can be expected to be 
extremely accurate in their screening and focus on the quality of the issuer and its 
corporate bonds. Given the interaction with investors, high screening standards should 
then be reflected in the performance of supervised corporate bonds. 
Bouvard and Levy (2011) argue that banks with a higher reputation improve the 
quality of information in the capital market. The bank‟s reputation affects the market 
positively, so that companies issuing bonds there perceive the market as more 
attractive for investments.
361
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In line with Andres et al. (2014) the bank‟s influence in their role as underwriter will 
be checked here in the bond market.
362
 But the focus of this thesis lies on both 
reputation and integrity, and reputation is measured differently. More precisely it is a 
quality of corporate bonds supervised by high integrity underwriters. It is the purpose 
of this study to determine whether the integrity and reputation of an underwriter or 
syndicate has an effect on supervised bonds, or in other words if banks with high 
integrity or reputation apply better underwriting standards.
363
 The corresponding 
hypotheses are: 
H1 a): The higher the underwriter’s or syndicate’s integrity, the better the 
performance of the underwritten bond. 
H1 b): The higher the underwriter’s or syndicate’s reputation, the better the 
performance of the underwritten bond. 
The first hypothesis will be tested with a logit regression analysis using "first rating 
action downgrade" as dependent variable, following Andres et al. (2014).
364
 This 
variable takes the value of 1 if a downgrade occurs, and zero otherwise.
365
 
Lando and Skødeberg (2002) see the dependent variable as appropriate because it 
generates an adequate uniform distribution. If bond default were chosen as the 
measure, the distribution would be falsified by the asymmetrical appearance of the 
event: bond default would be classified as rare.
366
 
Andres et al. (2014) describe the significant negative influence of a downgrade on the 
bond price. They continue that downgrades have a negative price effect and can lead to 
more own-capital backing, which obviously results in less liquidity.
367
 In contrast to an 
upgrade, a downgrade is more important for the empirical analysis.
368
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Impact on performance will affect pricing, as if the market were conscious of the 
bank‟s integrity and reputation.369 This is the reason for testing whether the market 
incorporates the future performance of the bond in its pricing. Pricing is measured on 
the basis of yield spread, which is the second variable. As already shown in this thesis, 
and concordantly with Andres et al. (2014), yield spread is the difference between the 
bond return and the U.S. Treasury with the same period of validity.
370
 Hence it 
constitutes the risk-adjusted financial costs of the bond issuer. 
As an alternative measure to yield spread for determining company costs, gross spread 
‒ a measure of underwriting fees ‒ can be used.371 Following Livingston and Miller 
(2000) as well as Fang (2005), gross spread has to be paid to the underwriter as a 
compensation for their services during the issue of bonds. If banks are, in fact, 
associated with better underwriting standards, this may be reflected in the underwriting 
fees, because issuers are willing to pay more to banks with higher standards. The 
higher willingness to pay could be explained by a lower risk due to the relationship 
between issuer and underwriter, because banks with high integrity and reputation will 
have best practices and customer focus.
372
 Hence the second hypothesis states: 
H2 a): The higher the syndicate of underwriter’s integrity, the higher the gross 
spread. 
H2 b): The higher the syndicate of underwriter’s reputation, the higher the gross 
spread. 
Subsequent analysis along these lines will determine whether an underwriter‟s 
integrity and reputation have an influence on the performance of corporate bonds and 
hence on the pricing of underwriters‟ fees. 
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4.2 Development of variables for integrity and reputation 
Since the focus of this study lies on the impact of integrity, the first step is to establish 
variables that make it possible to measure that quality. However, it is difficult to find 
variables that would reliably measure integrity as defined by Simons (1999) and 
Jensen (2009), whose work was discussed in the theoretical part of this thesis. The 
converse approach ‒ creating variables for violations of integrity ‒ is in fact more 
promising, as violations of integrity can be measured more easily. Given the focus of 
this thesis on the behavior of banks, it is not important whether actions detrimental to 
integrity have been performed intentionally or accidentally. Either way they harm 
trust.  
Motivated by the cases mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, in which banks lost 
trust due to their actions (e.g. settlement payments), the following seven variables are 
suggested as means to measure violations of integrity: 
1. Restatements of operating results 
2. Settlement payments 
3. Money-laundering 
4. Corruption and bribery 
5. Class action lawsuits 
6. Embezzlement and misappropriation 
7. Misuse 
 
The first variable, restatements of operating result, follows several authors who have 
already connected restatements with integrity.
373
 The following seven variables are all 
new and to the best of my knowledge have not been used so far in economic science as 
proxies for integrity. Settlement payments as well as class action lawsuits represent 
actions which indicate some kind of confession of guilt, which always brings a loss of 
trust in its wake. Money-laundering, corruption, bribery, embezzlement, 
misappropriation and misuse are actions that violate the law and therefore also cause 
mistrust once they become known. Finally, regulatory enforcements always have a 
good reason for being set up. These enforcements make lack of integrity on the part of 
their subject public. If a bank has not committed such violations, it can be deemed to 
possess integrity.
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In addition to integrity, the influence of reputation is also important here. In this 
context the variable is whether or not a bank‟s reputation score is higher than average. 
The relevant measurement procedure has been described in detail in 2.2.3: The Fortune 
Score as a reputation measure.   
 
4.3 Control variables 
The set of variables is completed with the control variables which have already proven 
significant in the context of bond certification. A short description of the main control 
variables follows. These are based on Andres et al. (2014) and the literature cited 
there.
374
 
Credit ratings: Following Guedhami and Pittman (2008) as well as Andres et al. 
(2014), Standard & Poor‟s (S&P) issue-specific credit rating is applied on notch level 
to test the impact on pricing and performance in the process of certification of 
corporate bonds.
375
 
Number of underwriters: A very important issue for the marketing of securities is 
underwriting syndicates, as their promotional efforts can influence investors.
376
 
Corwin and Schulz (2005) establish that syndicates with more underwriters lead to a 
revision of offer prices in equity IPOs.
377
 The approach of Puri (1996) and Andres et 
al. (2014) is followed here when testing for numbers of underwriters.
378
 
NYSE/AMEX listing: Affleck-Graves et al. show that other listed firms have lower 
minimum listing requirements than those listed on NYSE or AMEX.
379
 Baker et al. 
(1999) find that there is a connection between higher firm visibility and NYSE 
listings.
380
 Moreover, the exchanges‟ quantitative and qualitative standards are given if 
a firm is listed on NYSE or AMEX. In this context Datta et al. (1997) show that costs 
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of IPOs of corporate bonds are lower if a firm is listed on NYSE or AMEX.
381
 
Summarizing, the borrowing costs of firms listed on NYSE or AMEX, when acting as 
issuers in bond markets, can be expected to be lower. 
Other controls: Further variables used here all concern initial yield spreads. Here 
again Andres et al. (2014) are followed, as their approach is similar to that of this 
thesis. These variables include callable bonds
382
, the BofA/Merrill Lynch high-yield 
(HY) index spread over 10-year Treasuries
383
, bond maturity
384
, and zero or step-up 
bonds.
385
 The following variables have been little researched so far: equity claw back 
provisions
386
 and SEC Rule 144A issues.
387
 All regressions control for economic and 
industry effects using indicator variables for years and industries (first-digit SIC 
codes). 
The following Table 2 gives a clear overview of all variables included in the regression 
analysis, as well as a detailed description of each one. Pair-wise correlations are shown 
in Table 3. 
Table 1: Description of employed variables 
Variables Definition Literature 
Callable Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bond is callable, 
zero otherwise. 
Livingston/Miller (2000), 
Fang (2005) 
Clawback Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bond has an equity 
clawback commission, zero otherwise. 
Goyal et al. (1998), Daniels et 
al. (2009) 
Credit rating The issuing specific credit rating on notch level from S&P at the 
point of the bond issue. 
Fenn (2000), Andres et al. 
(2013) 
Downgrade Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bond’s first rating 
action is a downgrade (in comparison to an upgrade), zero 
otherwise. Issue specific credit rating from Standard & Poor 
(S&P) are being used. 
 Andres et al. (2013) 
Gross spread Measures the fee underwriters charge for compensation. The 
gross spread is calculated as the relation of the fee in UUS Dollar 
Fang (2005) 
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relative to the issue volume of the bonds. 
High-yield index spread Measures the return of the B of A/Merrill Lynch High-Yield 
Master Index for ten years old high yield bonds by risk-free U.S: 
treasuries. 
Fridson/Garman (1998), 
Andres et al. (2013) 
Industry dummies To control for industry specific effects dummy variables are 
being used for each industry (following Fama-French 12 industry 
classifications), which the issuers are part of. 
Based on Gande et al. (1997), 
who use 1-digit SIC codes 
Integrity index Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the whole syndicate 
neither has had a no case of corruption or bribery, restatement, 
money-laundering nor settlement payment. 
To the best of our knowledge 
not used so far. 
Integrity index linear Dummy variable which that sums up the dummies of the four 
compliance cases and hence can have a value of 0 to four. The 
value four stands for the highest integrity of the supervising 
underwriter syndicate. 
To the best of our knowledge 
not used so far. 
Make whole  Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bond has a make 
whole commission, zero otherwise. 
Powers/Tsyplakov (2008) 
Maturity 
NYSE/AMEX 
The logarithm of maturity in the bond’s months. 
Dummy variable that takes a value of line 1 if the issuing firm is 
listed on either NYSE or AMEX, zero otherwise. 
Fenn (2000), Fang (2005) 
Proportion LUs with 
bribery or corruption 
case 3 yrs 
Divides the  number of lead underwriters (LU) which supervise a 
bond in a syndicate of underwriters and which have had a case 
of bribery/corruption in the last three years before the bond 
issue by the number of lead underwriters (LU) which supervise a 
bond (in a syndicate). 
To the best of our knowledge 
not used so far. 
Proportion LUs with 
class action lawsuit 
case 3 yrs 
Divides the number of lead underwriters (LU) which supervise a 
bond in a syndicate of underwriters and which have had a case 
of class action lawsuit in the last three years before the bond 
issue by the number of lead underwriters (LU) which supervise a 
bond (in a syndicate). 
To the best of our knowledge 
not used so far. 
Proportion LUs with 
compliance case 3 yrs 
Divides the number of lead underwriters (LU) which supervise a 
bond in a syndicate of underwriters and which have had a case 
of compliance in the last three years before the bond issue by 
the number of lead underwriters (LU) which supervise a bond (in 
a syndicate). Compliance cases include bribery/corruption, class 
action lawsuits, money-laundering, misuse, misappropriation, 
embezzlement and settlement payments. 
To the best of our knowledge 
not used so far. 
Proportion LUs with 
misuse, 
misappropriation or 
embezzlement case 3 
Divides the number of lead underwriters (LU) which supervise a 
bond in a syndicate of underwriters and which have had a case 
of misuse, misappropriation or embezzlement in the last three 
years before the bond issue by the number of lead underwriters 
To the best of our knowledge 
not used so far. 
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yrs (LU) which supervise a bond (in a syndicate). 
Proportion LUs with 
money-laundering case 
3 yrs 
Divides the number of lead underwriters (LU) which supervise a 
bond in a syndicate of underwriters and which have had a case 
of money-laundering in the last three years before the bond 
issue by the number of lead underwriters (LU) which supervise a 
bond (in a syndicate). 
To the best of our knowledge 
not used so far. 
Proportion LUs with 
settlement payment 
case 3 yrs 
Divides the number of lead underwriters (LU) which supervise a 
bond in a syndicate of underwriters and which have had a case 
of settlement payment in the last three years before the bond 
issue by the number of lead underwriters (LU) which supervise a 
bond (in a syndicate). 
To the best of our knowledge 
not used so far. 
Time dummies To control macroeconomic effects and time trends the dummy 
variables are being used for each year of the observation period 
(each calendar year of the bond issue.). 
Fang (2005), Andres et al. 
(2013) 
Public firm Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the issuer is a publicly 
traded company, zero otherwise. 
Fenn (2000), Andres et al. 
(2013) 
Rule 144A Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bond is issued 
under SEC Rule 144A which stands for an accelerated bond 
issue, zero otherwise. 
Fenn (2000), Andres et al. 
(2013) 
Senior unsecured Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if is senior unsecured 
(but has a high seniority in capital structure), zero otherwise. 
Based on John et al. (2010), 
Andres et al. (2013) 
Syndicate w/o 
compliance case 3 yrs. 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the syndicate of the 
supervising lead underwriters has not had a case of compliance 
before the bond issue. Compliance cases cover the following 
separately investigated categories: corruption and bribery, 
money-laundering, restatements of operating results, 
settlement payments, class action lawsuits, misappropriation 
and embezzlement, misuse, regulatory enforcements.  
To the best of our knowledge 
not used so far. 
Top 8 lead 
underwriters 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the lead underwriter 
of a bond is among the top 8 lead underwriters in the yearly 
league table of Bloomberg. If a bond is supervised by more 
leading underwriters in line with Fang (2005), the one with the 
highest ranking in the league table is chosen (the maximum of 
the underwriter’s reputation). 
Fang (2005) 
Volume The logarithm of the bond’s issuing volume. Puri (1996), Andres et al. 
(2013) 
Yield spread Pricing is measured by yield spreads. The yield spread 
represents the risk-adjusted costs of financing the bond issuer. 
Following Andres et al. (2013) yield spread is equal to the 
offering return minus the return of a US Treasury or similar 
Livingston/Miller (2000), 
Andres et al. (2013) 
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maturity at the issuing date. 
Zero or step-up  Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the bond has the 
coupon type step-up or zero coupon, zero otherwise. 
Fenn (2000), Andres et al. 
(2013) 
# Covenants Measures the number of covenants a bond has. Based on Powers/Tsyplakov 
(2008) 
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Table 2: Pair-wise Correlations 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
5. Methodology 
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish the theoretical background for the regression 
analysis to be conducted in Chapter 6. Chapter 4 has already initiated the first steps of 
the empirical analysis by describing the development of the variables and hypotheses 
relating to integrity. 
To check the hypotheses and the implemented variables a model is necessary which 
makes that possible. The method applied in this thesis is regression analysis. The 
empirical study involves multiple regression analysis, as well as binary logistic 
regression analysis, so those two analytic models will be explained in this chapter. The 
chapter thus facilitates understanding of the subsequent empirical section. 
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5.1 Basics of the Multiple Linear Regression Model 
 
In general a classical multiple linear regression model investigates the connection 
between a dependent variable Y and various independent variables X1, X2, ..., Xp. The 
regression function with p regressors is: 
yv = β0 + β1 x1v + β2 x2v + ∙∙∙ + βp xpv + εv  with v = 1, ..., n.  (1) 
where ε represents an error term for which the following characteristics are valid: E(εv) 
= 0 and Var(εv) = σ
2; εv and εw are independent for all v ≠ w.
388
 Every influential 
variable xj has its own effect on the target Y which is described by the regression 
coefficient βj.
389
 The principle of the regression model is to attribute the change in the 
dependent variable Y to the influence of the model, depending on specified 
variables.
390
 The regression estimate principally only seeks to determine the strength of 
the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable.
391
 
The application of multiple linear regression analysis needs an approximation of the 
coefficients.
392
 In this case β0 stands for the intercept, or the estimated intercept point, 
of the regression line with the Y axis, while the coefficients βj specify the estimated 
gradient of the regression axis.
393
 During the further procedure these unknown 
constants are marked as 𝛽 0,  𝛽 1, ..., 𝛽 p.
394
 To estimate the regression coefficients the 
ordinary least squares method is generally used. This minimizes the sum of the squared 
distances corresponding to the following function: 
∑𝑣=1
𝑛 (yv - (𝛽 0 +𝛽 1 x1v +𝛽 2 x2v +∙∙∙+𝛽 pxpv))
2
= min.
395
                (2) 
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In the multiple regression model the interpretation of the regression coefficients is of 
particular interest. The coefficient‟s sign reveals whether the independent variable has 
a positive or negative impact on the dependent variable.
396
 Furthermore, the value of 
the βj signals in which way the command variable changes if the appropriate variable 
xj rises by one and all the other factors are kept constant.
397
 
In addition, the multiple regression model tests single coefficients for their explanatory 
power and determines to what extent they are really necessary.
398
 Statistical tests help 
investigate this connection. 
 
5.2 Hypothesis Testing on Statistical Significance 
 
An hypothesis testing is conducted to inspect whether conclusions about control 
samples apply to the population as well.
399
 Hypotheses are conclusions derived from 
general theory. In an empirical study a distinction is made between the alternative 
hypothesis and the null hypothesis. Alternative hypotheses are innovative statements 
that aim to extend the current state of research. Consequently, it will be exciting to see 
whether reality is mirrored more precisely by the innovative conclusions made in the 
empirical analysis in Chapter 6 than could have been foreseen from the theories 
described in Chapter 3.
400
 
Prior to determining the statistical significance of the results in the regression analysis, 
a competing null hypothesis has to be formulated; this expresses the complementary 
prediction to the alternative hypothesis as true. The inspection of the alternative 
hypothesis assumes the denial of the null hypothesis. Therefore showing that the null 
hypothesis is wrong opens the way to acceptance of the alternative hypothesis.
401
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Nevertheless, the difficulty remains that the results of the investigation are based on a 
control sample, but the hypotheses refer to the population as such.
402
 
Hypothesis tests, as well as significance tests, address the question whether an effect in 
a control sample is random or whether it is representative for the whole population.
403
 
Two mistakes may happen here. On the one hand the alternative hypothesis can be 
erroneously accepted although the null hypothesis is valid for the population. This is 
called α error or type 1 error. On the other hand the null hypothesis may be accepted 
although the alternative hypothesis is valid for the population. The second mistake is 
called β error or type 2 error. 404  In practice the latter error is rarely taken into 
consideration, because its probability can only be determined by additional 
assumptions with regard to the content.
405
 
Significance tests primarily determine the probability of an α error. In this thesis the 
tests focus on differences in the arithmetic average between population and control 
sample. These scatter around null and follow a distribution. In the case of small control 
samples they follow the so called t distribution, and in the case of bigger control 
samples they follow the standard normal distribution or z distribution.  A test statistic 
can be estimated from sample size, arithmetic average and variances. This test statistic 
is standardized by a standard scale which matches either the t or the z distribution.
406
 
In this way the results of different studies become comparable.
407
 
The test statistic that inspects each coefficient for the null hypothesis H0 : βj = 0 is 
defined as:                                           
     
408
  
                                                             (3) 
      
                                                          
402
 Cf. Bortz (2000), p. 110. 
403
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404
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406
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Where

designates the standard error of the estimated regression coefficients.
409
 
The level of significance results from the tests of differences in arithmetic averages 
conducted in this thesis as a test statistic. It describes the probability of an α error, but 
the significance does not allow any conclusions concerning the probability of its 
existence or of its theoretical importance on the effect.
410
 To guarantee comparability 
and the quality of the present research, it has been decided not to deny the null 
hypothesis until the probability of an error is less than or equal to five percent. If this 
probability is less than or equal to one percent it is called highly significant.
411
 
If the hypothesis H0 : βj = 0 is correct, then the test statistics have t distributions with 
(n - (p+1)) variances with a normal error distribution curve.
412
 Here the variance 
determines the level of freely available observations that arise from the sampling scope 
n minus the level of parameters estimated from the sample statistic.
413
 The p-value 
mentioned above, which determines the relevant variable as eminent or not, appears to 
be more differentiated here than has so far been explained. A three star symbolism has 
established itself in this context to facilitate recognition of the significance of the 
results.
414
 The empirical analysis following in Chapter 6accepts this convention within 
the following limits: 
[*] 0.10 ≥ P ≥ 0.05,   [**] 0.05 ≥ P ≥ 0.01,   [***] P ≤ 0.01. 
Hence a value of P > 0.10 is not significant in this context. 
 
The coefficient of determination R
2
 
After the procedure of regression analysis, it is necessary to investigate to what extent 
the model‟s assumptions are fulfilled. Thus the coefficient of determination R2 is 
calculated, giving an indication of the reproduction level between model and reality. It 
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can be described as the quality of the model.
415
 If the result comes close to 1, the 
reproduction will be more precise, and hence the dependent variable can be explained 
better.
416
 
The explained segment of the variance of the y values generally rises automatically 
with the increase of regressors in the linear correlation.
417
As a result, the coefficient of 
determination cannot shrink if the number of independent variables increases.
418
 If the 
R
2
 is small and therefore  signals a low level of the variance to be explained, the x 
values can have a significant influence.
419
 
 
Binary logistic regression 
A binary logistic regression, which is also known as the logit model for binary data, is 
usually used when the dependent variable Y has only two parameter values: e.g. "is 
true" (Y = 1) or "is not true" (Y = 0).
420
 It is obvious then that the dependent variable 
is binary, or coded as binary.
421
 In contrast to a linear regression, which determines the 
level of the dependent variable itself, a logistic regression estimates the likelihood of 
occurrence concerning the  chosen dependent variables Y.
422
This calculates the 
predicted value of conditional probability.
423
 The aim of a binary logistic regression is 
to estimate the probability with which the coefficient βj reacts on the independent 
variable xj.
424
 During the process of binary logistic regression it is essential to 
investigate in which direction, positive or negative, and how strongly each variable 
influences this probability.
425
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Part of the modeling is unknown success probability π, whose influence can depend on 
various independent variables.
426
 The conditional probability P(Y = 1|X = x) = π (x) is 
valid for the dependent variable Y.
427
 The link function in the logit transformation is: 
g(x) = β0 + β1 x1 + ∙∙∙ + βp xp                         (4) 
π(x) =  
( )
( )1
g x
g x
e
e
with  0 ≤  π(x)  ≤ 1.      (5) 
The transformation of (5) leads to: 
g(π(x)) = ln 
( )
( ).
1 ( )
x
x


        (6) 
where g(π) denotes the logit function. 428  In this model the influencing values are 
assumed as interval-scaled quantitatively ascertained characteristics.
429
 Binary 
variables can also be used in this model equation if they are scaled 0/1.
430
 If multiple 
independent variables are being investigated in the process of a regression model, the 
effect (or impact) which each variable adds for explanation of the dependent variable is 
reflected in the coefficients.
431
 
The parameter estimates for testing the null hypothesis H0 : βj = 0 are ascertained by a 
so called Wald Statistic.
432
 Instead of t values, which are part of the linear model, z 
values appear in the logit model: 
     
.j
j
z
j

 



 
The interpretation of those P values that correspond to the z values plays an important 
role for the impact of the corresponding determining factors in the model.
433
 As in the 
                                                          
426
 Cf. Sachs and Hedderich (2009), p. 675. 
427
 Cf. Sachs and Hedderich (2009), p. 680. 
428
 Cf. Schlittgen (2009), p. 204. 
429
 Cf. Sachs and Hedderich (2009), p. 680. 
430
 Cf. Sachs and Hedderich (2009), p. 680. The regression model of this thesis contains among other 
things binary variables. 
431
 Cf. Sachs and Hedderich (2009), p. 684. 
432
 For detailed information about the method of the Wald Statistic see Sachs/ Hedderich (2009), p. 
678 f. 
433
 Cf. Groß (2010), p. 227. 
5.2 Hypothesis Testing on Statistical Significance                                                                           91 
 
 
linear regression approach, a low P value signals the relevance of the corresponding 
determining factor.
434
 
Finally pseudo-R
2
 gives information about the quality with which the model expresses 
reality. But pseudo-R
2 (0 ≤ R2 ≤ 1) is a relative measure indicating that high values  
signal an improvement in the model adaptation.
435
 So the interpretation of pseudo-
R
2
differs from that of the linear regression, because the explanatory value of the 
exploited variance in the regression estimate is different.
436
 For example one problem 
is that, unlike the coefficient of determination in the linear regression
437
, pseudo-R2 
rarely reaches values of 0.8 or higher. 
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6. Empirical Analysis 
 
Chapter 6comprises the most important aspects of this thesis, as it presents the data on 
which the thesis is based. This if followed by an explanation of the set of corporate 
bonds, together with details of the banks operating as underwriters. The first section of 
the chapter ends with a description of the integrity and reputation measures, and the 
second section completes the empirical analysis with a discussion of the results for the 
main variables, integrity and reputation, and for the control variables, as well as of 
their influence on performance and costs represented by three dependent variables.  
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6.1 Data 
This section of the thesis describes the data on which the empirical analysis is based. 
Every single variable in the set of variables and the pair-wise correlations have been 
shown in Table 2 and Table 3 of chapter 4. 
Corporate bonds: Investment banks and lead underwriter are seen as synonymous. 
The data should help to illuminate the role of underwriters‟ integrity and reputation in 
the process of certification, as well as possible consequences due to a lack of integrity 
or reputation. 
To complete the corporate bonds data, information has been collected from Standard & 
Poor‟s Capital IQ database.438 This includes all the information on corporate bonds in 
the U.S. market available in the database, once those bonds have been removed from 
the data set that do not show any information about the supervising underwriter or 
about the S&P credit rating assigned on the issuing date. After the removal procedure, 
9769 corporate bonds issued by underwriters in the U.S. (more than 6000 of them 
American)remain for the period 2002-2010. The number of supervising underwriters is 
between 1 and 5. More detailed information about the allocation of the bond ratings is 
provided in Table 4. 
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Table 3: Data of Misbehavior (2002-2010) 
Cases Cases between 2002-2010 
(in total) 
Remaining cases of banks 
(manually checked) 
Restatements 3588 625 
Settlement Payments 2340 2340 
Money-Laundering 445 98 
Corruption & Bribery 531 531 
Class Action Lawsuits 6375 661 
Embezzlement & 
Misappropriation 
409 51 
Misuse 401 35 
Total 14089 4341 
 
Banks: Between 2002 and 2010, 258 international banks were involved in the process 
of certification as underwriters. Those 258 banks in the data set can be divided into 84 
parent companies and 174 subsidiaries. Although only American corporate bonds are 
considered here, their underwriter s are international. 
Integrity Measures: The following cases of compliance are used to establish 
measures of integrity: restatements of operating results, settlement payments, money-
laundering, corruption and bribery, class action lawsuits, embezzlement and 
misappropriation, misuse, and regulatory enforcements. The information for all of 
these cases is again taken from the database S&P Capital IQ for the period 2002-2010. 
Keyword searches are made in Capital IQ to extract the data for each case of 
compliance. In the next step each set of data is edited separately and manually, as 
keyword searches in themselves do not provide firm evidence. For example a keyword 
search with „compliance‟ produces results not only for relevant compliance cases but 
also for news announcing changes in compliance structures. Each and every result 
must consequently be checked manually to ascertain whether it is a relevant case or 
not. Furthermore, in cases where S&P Capital IQ is not clear enough for interpretation 
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an Internet search is necessary. Table 5 gives an overview of the number of cases for 
each integrity measure, as well as the number of manually checked cases: 
Table 4: Allocation of bond ratings 
(bond issues between 2002-2010 in the U.S.) 
 
Rating 
Number of bonds: Percentage of bonds: 
AAA to AA- 391 4 
A 293 3 
A+ 586 6 
A- 489 5 
BBB+ 684 7 
BBB 976 10 
BBB- 782 8 
BB+ 391 4 
BB 391 4 
BB- 684 7 
B+ 879 9 
B 1074 11 
B- 1367 14 
Without rating 782 8 
Total: 9769 100 
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After these filtering stages, the information gained is matched with the corporate bond 
data set and the corresponding underwriters by setting up dummy variables. Every 
question answered with "yes" gets a "1" and stands for a compliance case, and "0" 
represents the answer "no" for every supervising bank. 
Afterwards the numbers and dummy variables are aggregated on bond level and 
multiple variables are generated for the upcoming analysis. The variables have a value 
of "1" if none of the supervising underwriters for a bond has had a case of compliance. 
The variable is then named e.g. "LU w/o „restatement‟ case". This procedure is 
repeated for each of the eight different cases of integrity; on this basis a new variable 
"LU w/o „compliance‟ case is created. This variable has a value of "1" if none of the 
supervising underwriters for a bond has been involved in a case of compliance.  
Furthermore, the ratio of underwriters with a compliance case is calculated on bond 
level as the percentage of the underwriter syndicate. This variable is called e.g. 
"Fraction LU restatement case". 
Reputation Measure: To measure the impact of bank‟s reputation a variable with the 
value of "1" is created if the supervising underwriter has a higher than average 
reputation. The variable is called "LU Rep FMAC Score lrgavg". This approach to 
measuring reputation has been explained in detail in 2.2.3 above. The question whether 
an issuer chooses the same lead underwriter again is investigated with the variable "LU 
was LU for same Issuer before". 
 
6.2 Empirical findings 
The analysis procedure applied here follows Andres et al. (2014). To control for 
industrial fixed effects, as well as time effects, the Fama French 12 industry 
classification is used with time dummies. The following section seeks to answer the 
research questions developed in Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
Bond performance and integrity 
Since the aim of the present study is to investigate the impact of underwriters‟ integrity 
and reputation on companies and investors in the bond market, the first hypothesis will 
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be tested by means of a logit regression analysis with the dependent variable "first 
rating action downgrade", to check whether there is a significant connection between 
trust, as an important issue in the certification process for companies and investors, 
and integrity and reputation. The dependent variable "first rating action downgrade" 
supports analysis of the impact of integrity and reputation on bond performance, 
because investment banks, in their function as lead underwriters, have the elemental 
duty of screening. They have, therefore, to select those companies they recommend for 
a bond issue and those they reject. In this context lead underwriters choose the issuer 
and analyze the bonds to be issued.
439
 In the process of certification, underwriting 
standards are defined by each bank independently, and due to this diversity they play 
an important role in the screening process. Banks that follow high underwriting 
standards will be extremely accurate in their screening and focus the quality of the 
issuer and its corporate bonds. Since there is interaction with investors here, high 
screening standards should be reflected in the performance of the bonds. 
The first hypotheses (H1a) and H1b), presented in Chapter 4, are tested with several 
logit regression analyses. In the first run, the influence of a syndicate of banks defined 
as possessing integrity is tested; none of these banks has had a case of violation in 
trust. This should yield a negative effect, indicating that the probability of a downgrade 
as the next rating action for the bond will decrease. Although the coefficient is as 
expected, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels (see Table 6, 
Regression 1). The next investigation focuses on the influence of six different groups 
of banks that have undergone a class action lawsuit, or case of restatement, bribery and 
corruption, misuse, misappropriation or embezzlement, settlement, or money-
laundering. (Some of the measures of integrity are bundled together here because of 
their similarity.) A positive impact can be expected, as bad behavior influences both 
companies‟ and investors‟ trust and raises the likelihood of a rating drop as the next 
rating action. Although for each heading the impact is positive, again none of the 
results is significant (see Table 6 Regressions 2-7). Summing up, hypothesis 1a) 
cannot be confirmed, as the results are not statistically significant. 
Two reasons for this are possible. First, the selected variables may not measure 
integrity as well as suggested. Secondly, integrity may be measured correctly but in 
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6.2 Empirical Findings                                                                                                                          98 
 
 
fact it has no influence on the bond market. Hypotheses 2 tests later on whether 
investors consider integrity as measured by this thesis in their pricing of bonds. 
In general, misbehavior is associated with negative consequences for the causer. In 
certain cases the economic advantages of misbehavior may outweigh the penalties. 
Moreover, rating agencies will estimate the company‟s economic situation afterwards 
as better than it was before. This could explain why the relationship is as expected, but 
the results are not significant.   
Bond performance and reputation 
The variable "Parent bank‟s reputation has a Fortune Most Admired Score larger than 
average" defines the highly reputable underwriter. Here a negative impact is likely, 
meaning that the reputation of the underwriter decreases the probability that the bond 
will be downgraded in the next rating action. All regressions in Table 6 show a 
significant negative impact at the 1% level, which confirms this hypothesis.  
Although this approach is based on Andres et al. (2014), these results do not match 
theirs. Focusing on the high-yield bond market, Andres et al. show that bonds 
underwritten by the most reputable underwriters and issued between 2000 and 2008 in 
the U.S. are associated with significantly higher downgrades and default risk.
440
 
In contrast, the evidence presented in this thesis indicates that all bonds issued between 
2002 and 2010 in the U.S. by reputable underwriters in the corporate bond market are 
beneficial to investors. The most plausible reason lies in the different approach to 
measuring reputation. Andres et al. (2014) use high-market share as an indicator of 
high reputation and focus exclusively on high-yield bonds.
441
 
A further investigation undertaken here is into the question whether banks have been 
lead underwriters for the same issuer before, which would indicate that they must have 
a good reputation for integrity. The impact on bond performance in this case should 
again be negative and decrease the probability of a downgrade. All logit regressions 
show a significant influence at the 10% level, indicating that companies tend to choose 
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the same banks as underwriters again. To the best of my knowledge no previous 
literature refers to this proxy. Table 6 shows all the results in this context. 
 
Table 5: Bond Performance (First Rating Action 
Downgrade) and Integrity/Reputation 
This table contains the results of the logit regression on the corporate bond´s performance measured as downgrade in the first 
rating. The bond issues have been taken place between 2002 and 2010 and have been supervised by different underwriter. All 
variables are defined and explained in table 1. Z statistics are based on standard errors which are called "White” and “issuer-
clustered”. "Issuer-clustered" follows the issuer-cluster standard errors referred to Petersen (2009). All regressions consider time 
and industry dummies. Statistical significance is on the 0.01(***), 0.05(**)  0.10(*)-level. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Syndicate w/o 
’compliance’case 
 
Fraction LU 
´restatement´ case 
-0,093 
(-1,22) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,068 
(0,63) 
 
     
Fraction LU ´class 
action´ case 
  0,175 
(1,56) 
 
    
Fraction LU 
´bribery/corruption´ 
case 
 
   0,311 
(1,44) 
 
   
Fraction LU 
´misu/misappr/ 
embezz case´ 
 
    0,225 
(1,47) 
 
  
Fraction LU 
´settlement´ case 
     0,046 
(0,51) 
 
 
Fraction LU ´money-
laundering´ case 
      0,303 
(1,66) 
 
LU was LU for same 
Issuer before 
-0,127 
(-1,83)* 
 
-0,127 
(-1,83)* 
 
-0,126 
(-1,82)* 
 
-0,125 
(-1,79)* 
 
-0,127 
(-1,82)* 
 
-0,126 
(-1,81)* 
 
-0,129 
(-1,86)* 
 
Parent Rep FMAC 
Score larger avg. 
-0,437 
(-3,85)*** 
 
-0,438 
(-3,86)*** 
 
-0,441 
(-3,89)*** 
 
-0,437 
(-3,85)*** 
 
-0,438 
(-3,86)*** 
-0,441 
(-3,88)*** 
 
-0,447 
(-3,93)*** 
 
Callable 0,064 
(0,82) 
 
0,064 
(0,82) 
 
-0,067 
(0,85) 
 
0,062 
(0,79) 
 
0,645 
(0,82) 
 
0,065 
(0,83) 
0,064 
(0,82) 
 
Clawback -0,209 
(-2,30)** 
 
-0,209 
(-2,29)** 
 
-0,209 
(-2,29)** 
 
-0,213 
(-2,33)** 
 
-0,204 
(-2,23)** 
 
-0,210 
(-2,30)** 
 
-0,213 
(-2,33)** 
Credit Rating 0,161 
(0,29) 
0,159 
(0,29) 
0,158 
(0,29) 
0,165 
(0,30) 
0,179 
(0,33) 
0,168 
(0,30) 
0,171 
(0,31) 
Make Whole 0,164 
(2,17)** 
0,168 
(2,22)** 
0,168 
(2,23)** 
0,170 
(2,25)** 
0,163 
(2,17)** 
0,167 
(2,21)** 
0,169 
(2,24)** 
Maturity 0,216 
(2,22)** 
0,219 
(2,26)** 
0,219 
(2,25)** 
0,220 
(2,27)** 
0,214 
(2,21)** 
0,220 
(2,27)** 
0,220 
(2,27)** 
NYSE/AMEX -0,377 
(-3,20)*** 
-0,381 
(-3,25)*** 
-0,376 
(-3,19)*** 
-0,382 
(-3,24)*** 
-0,375 
(-3,18)*** 
-0,382 
(-3,25)*** 
-0,391 
(-3,32)*** 
Public Firm 0,008 
(0,07) 
0,012 
(0,10) 
0,004 
(0,04) 
0,001 
(0,11) 
0,005 
(0,04) 
0,013 
(0,12) 
0,024 
(0,21) 
Putable 1,393 
(1,75)* 
1,380 
(1,74*) 
1,369 
(1,73*) 
1,381 
(1,74)* 
1,383 
(1,74)* 
1,372 
(1,73)* 
1,358 
(1,72)* 
SEC144A -0,021 
(-0,21) 
-0,021 
(-0,21) 
-0,020 
(-0,19) 
-0,020 
(-0,20)* 
-0,020 
(-0,20) 
-0,019 
(-0,19) 
0,276 
(1,72) 
Senior unsecured -0,084 
 (-1,06) 
-0,082 
(-1,04) 
-0,081 
(-1,03) 
-0,081 
(-1,03) 
-0,085 
(-1,07) 
-0,079 
(-1,00) 
-0,079 
(-1,01) 
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Top 8 LUs 0,668 
(7,88)*** 
0,665 
(7,85)*** 
0,665 
(7,85***) 
0,665 
(7,85)*** 
0,683 
(8,00)*** 
0,660 
(7,72)*** 
0,652 
(7,63)*** 
Volume -0,102 
(-2,10)** 
-0,097 
(-2,00)** 
-0,096 
(-1,99)** 
-0,098 
(-2,03)** 
-0,101 
(-2,08)** 
0,096 
(-1,98)** 
-0,095 
(-1,96)** 
# Covenants -0,000 
(-0,06) 
 
-0,001 
(-0,08) 
 
-0,001 
(-0,13) 
-0,001 
(-0,11) 
-0,000 
(-0,05) 
-0,001 
(-0,09) 
-0,000 
(-0,07) 
Years 
Observations 
2002-2010 
6009 
2002-2010 
6009 
2002-2010 
6009 
2002-2010 
6009 
2002-2010 
6009 
2002-2010 
6007 
2002-2010 
6009 
Pseudo R2 0.1145 0.1144 0.1146 0.1146 0,1146 0,0441 0,1147 
p-value (Wald χ2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Time and Industry 
Dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
It may be concluded that experience with banks and trust in their recommendations are 
important issues directly for companies, as well as indirectly for shareholders.   
Price effect and integrity 
Andres et al. (2014) describe the significant negative influence of a downgrade on 
bond price. They observe that downgrades can also lead to more own capital backing, 
which obviously results in less liquidity.
442
 For empirical analysis, a downgrade is 
considerably more important than an upgrade.
443
 
The employed proxies for integrity show no significant impact on bond performance, 
so a distinctive relationship between integrity and the price can´t be expected anymore 
in an efficient market.
444
 To verify this assumption an additional analysis is performed 
on market efficiency and the pricing of bonds. If the market is efficient, none of the 
results will be significant. Pricing is measured here on the basis of yield spread, which 
represents the second dependent variable. Yield spread constitutes the risk-adjusted 
financial costs of an issuer of bonds. As already observed, and concordantly with 
Andres et al. (2014), yield spread is defined here as the difference between the return 
on the offering and the U.S. Treasury, both with the same period of validity.
445
 
                                                          
442
 Cf. Wansley et al. (1992), Hand et al. (1992), Hite and Warga (1997). 
443
 Cf. Andres et al. (2014),  p. 8. 
444
 In this context an efficient market is defined the way that during the process of bond pricing the 
market is already aware of the fact that integrity has no influence on the bond performance. 
445
 Cf. Andres et al. (2014),  p. 9. 
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In particular it can be expected that underwriters with established integrity
446
 will have 
no effect on the yield spread. This means that the risk-adjusted costs for issuers will 
not change because the market is efficient. Several ordinary least squared regressions 
are conducted to test these expectation. The procedure and the variables for integrity 
are the same as before, only the type of regression has changed. The syndicate with 
established integrity shows no impact on the yield spread, which indicates that the 
market is efficient. (see Table 7, Regression 1). The headings "class action lawsuit" 
and "misuse, misappropriation and embezzlement" don´t show any impact either. Both 
groups match expectations. In line with these findings the remaining groups under the 
heading of violation of trust all are not significant, except for one, the "bribery and 
corruption" group. Here a significant impact on the yield spread is found, as such 
behavior decreases the issuer‟s costs significantly at the 5% level. For detailed results 
see Table 7, Regressions 2-7. 
Summing up, integrity has no impact on the performance of bonds or company costs. 
Two reasons are possible: either the variables for integrity actually do not measure 
integrity or the market does not value integrity. Either way the results are consistent. 
 
Price effect and reputation 
Along with the last ordinary least squared regressions described above, checks were 
made for the impact of underwriters‟ reputation on the price measured as yield spread. 
In line with the findings in performance, here again significant results are found in 
each regression at the 1% level, indicating that high reputation is recognized by the 
market. This is in line with the literature, confirming the results of Anginer et al. 
(2011), who show that there is an inverse relation between a company‟s reputation and 
its bond credit spreads.
447
 
In this connection it can also be shown that companies frequently choose the same 
issuer as before. To the best of my knowledge this has not been previously shown. The 
results are significant at a 1% level in every OLS regression. Detailed information is 
provided in Table 7, Regressions 1-7.  
                                                          
446
 This is based on the way integrity has been measured in this thesis. 
447
 Cf. Anginer et al. (2011), p. 2. 
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Table 6: Yield Spread and Integrity/Reputation 
This table contains the results of the OLS regression on the corporate bond´s costs measured as yield spread. The bond issues 
have been taken place between 2002 and 2010 and have been supervised by different underwriter. All variables are defined and 
explained in table 1. Z statistics are based on standard errors which are called "White” and “issuer-clustered”. "Issuer-clustered" 
follows the issuer-cluster standard errors referred to Petersen (2009). All regressions consider time and industry dummies. 
Statistical significance is on the 0.01(***), 0.05(**)  0.10(*)-level. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Syndicate w/o 
’compliance’case 
 
Fraction LU 
´restatement´ case 
1,871 
(0,29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3,101 
(-0,37) 
 
     
Fraction LU ´class 
action´ case 
  2,231 
(0,32) 
 
    
Fraction LU 
´bribery/corruption´ 
case 
 
   -31,655 
(-2,33)** 
 
   
Fraction LU 
´misu/misappr/ 
embezz case´ 
 
    8,092 
(0,88) 
 
  
Fraction LU 
´settlement´ case 
     7,826 
(-0,82) 
 
 
Fraction LU ´money-
laundering´ case 
      -17,090 
(-1,26) 
 
LU was LU for same 
Issuer before 
-28,434 
(-5,37)*** 
 
-28,428 
(-5,40)*** 
 
-28,475 
(-5,39)*** 
 
-28,745 
(-5,46)*** 
 
-28,488 
(-5,39)*** 
 
-28,226 
(-5,36)*** 
 
-28,620 
(-5,38)*** 
 
Parent Rep FMAC 
Score larger avg. 
-31,521 
(-4,65)*** 
 
-31,574 
(-4,56)*** 
 
-31,451 
(-4,59)*** 
 
-31,633 
(-4,61)*** 
 
-31,409 
(-4,58)*** 
 
-31,524 
(-4,56)*** 
 
-31,829 
(-4,67)*** 
 
Callable 4,008 
(0,79) 
 
4,016 
(0,80) 
 
4,042 
(0,80) 
 
4,289 
(0,85) 
 
4,008 
(0,79) 
 
3,990 
(0,80) 
 
4,007 
(0,81) 
 
Clawback -1,019 
(-0,15) 
 
-1,074 
(-0,16) 
 
-0,998 
(-0,15) 
 
-0,692 
(-0,10) 
 
-0,756 
(-0,11) 
 
-1,400 
(-0,21) 
 
-1,003 
(-0,15) 
 
Credit Rating -20,281 
(-12,43)*** 
-20,256 
(-11,86)*** 
-20,307 
(-12,21)*** 
-20,129 
(-12,05)*** 
-20,309 
(-12,23)*** 
-20,253 
(-11,96)*** 
-20,293 
(-12,21)*** 
Make Whole 8,656 
(1,70)* 
8,631 
(1,68)* 
8,656 
(1,70)* 
8,595 
(1,67)* 
8,407 
(1,64) 
8,809 
(1,69) 
8,456 
(1,65)* 
Maturity -105,592 
(-14,18)*** 
-105,664 
(-14,13)*** 
-105,592 
(-14,18)*** 
-105,718 
(-14,13)*** 
-105,744 
(-14,12)*** 
-105,630 
(-14,11)*** 
-105,539 
(-14,12)*** 
NYSE/AMEX -39,657 
(-2,19)** 
-39,631 
(-2,15)** 
-39,657 
(-2,19)** 
-39,638 
(-2,17)** 
-39,291 
(-2,14)** 
-39,783 
(-2,15)** 
-40,008 
(-2,19)** 
Public Firm -2,352 
(-0,14) 
-2,371 
(-0,14) 
-2,352 
(-0,14) 
-2,375 
(-0,14) 
-2,694 
(-0,16) 
-2,694 
(-0,14) 
-1,777 
(-0,11) 
Putable 146,337 
(3,09)** 
146,439 
(3,05)** 
146,337 
(3,09)** 
145,692 
(3,05)** 
147,395 
(3,10)** 
146,490 
(3,06)** 
145,405 
(3,06)** 
SEC144A 10,927 
(1,17) 
10,888 
(1,18) 
10,927 
(1,17)** 
10,554 
(1,13)** 
10,953 
(1,18)** 
10,793 
(1,17)** 
10,924 
(1,18)** 
Senior unsecured -22,255 
 (-3,99)*** 
-22,228 
 (-3,99)*** 
-22,255 
 (-3,99)*** 
-22,216 
 (-3,99)*** 
-22,453 
 (-4,03)*** 
-22,213 
 (-3,99)*** 
-22,254 
 (-3,99)*** 
Top 8 LUs -10,633 
(-1,84)* 
-10,522 
(-1,75)* 
-10,633 
(-1,84)* 
-9,823 
(-1,67)* 
-10,300 
(-1,75)* 
-9,653 
(-1,47)* 
-11,752 
(-1,96)* 
Volume -13,251 
(-3,71)*** 
-13,305 
(-3,91)*** 
-13,251 
(-3,71)*** 
-13,173 
(-3,84)*** 
-13,519 
(-3,93)*** 
-13,241 
(-3,88)*** 
-13,292 
(-3,86)*** 
# Covenants 0,603 
(1,04) 
 
0,604 
(1,05) 
 
0,603 
(1,04) 
 
0,635 
(1,10) 
 
0,612 
(1,06) 
 
0,616 
(1,07) 
 
0,612 
(1,06) 
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Years 
Observations 
2002-2010 
5639 
2002-2010 
5639 
2002-2010 
5639 
2002-2010 
5639 
2002-2010 
5639 
2002-2010 
5638 
2002-2010 
5639 
Pseudo R2 0.6126 0.6126 0.6126 0.6129 0.6129 0.6127 0.6127 
p-value (Wald χ2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Time and Industry 
Dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Underwriter fees and integrity 
For robustness the final regressions check whether integrity has a significant impact on 
the alternative measure of corporate costs, namely gross spread. It expresses a measure 
for underwriting fees.
448
 Here again, no significant results will be found if the market 
is efficient. Following Livingston and Miller (2000) and Fang (2005), the gross spread 
has to be paid to the underwriters as a compensation for their services during the issue 
of bonds. If banks are, in fact, associated with better underwriting standards, this 
would be measurable in the underwriting fees, because issuers are willing to pay more 
for those banks with better standards. The higher willingness to pay could be explained 
by lower risk, due to the relationship between issuer and underwriter, because banks 
with integrity and high reputation are presumed to have best practices and customer 
focus.
449
 This check resembles the previous check on market efficiency conducted with 
variable yield spread. It refers in particular to hypotheses H2 a): "the higher the 
underwriter syndicate‟s integrity, the higher the gross spread", and H2 b): "the higher 
the underwriter syndicate‟s reputation, the higher the gross spread". 
As expected the ordinary least squared regression show no significant influence of 
integrity in the syndicate of underwriters on the gross spread. The two measures of 
integrity "misuse, misappropriation and embezzlement" and "settlement payments" 
show no significance either and match expectations. All other variables are in line with 
these results except restatements of operating results. This measure of integrity shows 
a significant influence at the 10% level. Summing up, these results only confirm 
hypothesis H2 for integrity in the case of restatements of operating results. 
                                                          
448
 Cf. Andres et al. (2014),  p. 4. 
449
 We assume that syndicates with less integrity have to charge lower fees because the issuer’s 
willingness to pay is lower for these underwriters. An adequate reason is the problem in trust as well. 
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Referring to the literature, Hribar and Jenkins (2004) show that the relative increase in 
capital costs in the month following a restatement lies between 7% and 19%.
450
 
Graham et al. (2008) observe that restatements will be discussed in public and will 
almost certainly have a negative effect on a company‟s reputation.451 Palmrose et al. 
(2004) analyzed restatements and resultant market reactions and established that the 
average abnormal return in a time slot of two days after the announcement of a 
restatement decreases.
452
 Anderson and Yohn (2002) showed that corrections in 
revenue recognition caused the highest spread in the stock market, and that their 
impact on investors‟ perceptions of corporate value, as well as on the information gap, 
was even higher than that caused by restatements concerning other financial data.
453
 
Restatements can also cause higher costs in the form of underwriter fees in the process 
of bond issuance, as Wang et al. (2013) show.
454
 The results for the variable 
restatements of operating results in the present study are thus in line with the 
consensus of the relevant literature. But all other variables match expectations of an 
efficient market.  
Underwriter fees and reputation 
The final investigation undertaken in this thesis is whether an underwriter‟s high 
reputation leads to higher fees for companies, measured in terms of gross spread. Even 
though the number of observations is considerably smaller (1769 as opposed to more 
than 6000) a significant impact on gross spread can be found at the 1% level for a high 
integrity syndicate and at the 10% level for all other measures of integrity. But in this 
context the results for the same issuer do not show any significance. All detailed 
information is provided in Table 8, Regressions 1-7. Again, the results for reputation 
are consistent with those shown for the performance and yield spread. 
 
                                                          
450
 Cf. Hribar and Jenkins (2004), p. 338. 
451
 Cf. Graham et al. (2008), p. 45 f. 
452
 Cf. Palmrose et al. (2004), p. 60. 
453
 Cf. Anderson and Yohn (2002), p. 4. 
454
 Cf. Wang et al. (2013), p. 1. 
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Table 7: Underwriter Fees (Gross Spread) and 
Integrity/Reputation 
This table contains the results of the OLS regression on the corporate bond´s costs measured as gross spread. The bond issues 
have been taken place between 2002 and 2010 and have been supervised by different underwriter. All variables are defined and 
explained in table 1. Z statistics are based on standard errors which are called "White” and “issuer-clustered”. "Issuer-clustered" 
follows the issuer-cluster standard errors referred to Petersen (2009). All regressions consider time and industry dummies. 
Statistical significance is on the 0.01(***), 0.05(**)  0.10(*)-level. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Syndicate w/o 
’compliance’case 
 
Fraction LU 
´restatement´ case 
0,158 
(0,93) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0,785 
(-1,79)* 
 
     
Fraction LU ´class 
action´ case 
  -0,050 
(-0,11) 
 
    
Fraction LU 
´bribery/corruption´ 
case 
 
   -0,253 
(-0,36) 
 
   
Fraction LU 
´misu/misappr/ 
embezz case´ 
 
    0,371 
(0,48) 
 
  
Fraction LU 
´settlement´ case 
     0,354 
(0,91) 
 
 
Fraction LU ´money-
laundering´ case 
      -0,063 
(0,13) 
 
LU was LU for same 
Issuer before 
-0,365 
(-1,15) 
 
-0,350 
(-1,14) 
 
-0,364 
(-1,19) 
 
-0,365 
(-1,19) 
 
-0,372 
(-1,21) 
 
-0,388 
(-1,26) 
 
-0,364 
(-1,18) 
 
Parent Rep FMAC 
Score larger avg. 
-0,630 
(-2,95)*** 
 
-0,621 
(-1,83)* 
 
-0,603 
(-1,76)* 
 
-0,600 
(-1,76)* 
 
-0,601 
(-1,77)* 
 
-0,608 
(-1,79)* 
 
-0,602 
(-1,76)* 
 
Callable 0,401 
(1,65) 
 
0,404 
(1,09) 
 
0,396 
(1,06) 
 
0,401 
(1,08) 
 
0,397 
(1,06) 
 
0,401 
(1,08) 
 
0,397 
(1,07) 
 
Clawback 2,713 
(3,35)*** 
 
2,628 
(3,34)*** 
 
2,727 
(3,47)*** 
 
2,725 
(3,47)*** 
 
2,719 
(3,46)*** 
 
2,703 
(3,44)*** 
 
2,726 
(3,47)*** 
 
Credit Rating -0,731 
(-10,36)*** 
-0,727 
(-2,34)** 
-0,728 
(-2,34)** 
-0,735 
(-2,36)** 
-0,726 
(-2,33)** 
-0,725 
(-2,33)** 
-0,728 
(-2,34)** 
Make Whole 1,211 
(2,25)** 
1,221 
(2,62)*** 
1,219 
(2,60)*** 
1,225 
(2,62)*** 
1,209 
(2,59)*** 
1,181 
(2,52)** 
1,219 
(2,60)*** 
Maturity 1,760 
(5,49)*** 
1,760 
(4,93)*** 
1,759 
(4,92)*** 
1,756 
(4,91)*** 
1,757 
(4,91)*** 
1,755 
(4,91)*** 
1,759 
(4,92)*** 
NYSE/AMEX -0,051 
(-0,10) 
-0,010 
(-0,02) 
-0,051 
(-0,06) 
-0,043 
(-0,08) 
-0,022 
(-0,04) 
-0,032 
(-0,06) 
-0,033 
(-0,06) 
Public Firm -0,669 
(-1,71)* 
-0,715 
(-1,15) 
-0,672 
(-1,08)* 
-0,662 
(-1,06)* 
-0,687 
(-1,10)* 
-0,668 
(-1,07)* 
-0,672 
(-1,08)* 
Putable -1,939 
(-3,30)*** 
-1,973 
(-0,64) 
-0,136 
(-0,62) 
-1,941 
(-0,62)*** 
-1,935 
(-0,62) 
-1,918 
(-0,62) 
-1,933 
(-0,62)*** 
SEC144A 18,199 
(1,11) 
18,177 
(11,50)*** 
18,178 
(11,48)*** 
18,167 
(11,47)*** 
18,199 
(11,49) 
18,201 
(11,50)*** 
18,177 
(11,48) 
Senior unsecured -0,087 
 (-0,12) 
-0,041 
 (-0,06) 
-0,085 
 (-0,12) 
-0,091 
 (-0,13) 
-0,106 
 (-0,15) 
-0,097 
 (-0,14) 
-0,083 
 (-0,12) 
Top 8 LUs 0,061 
(0,27) 
0,119 
(0,32) 
0,063 
(0,17) 
0,067 
(0,18) 
0,090 
(0,24) 
0,001 
(0,00) 
0,065 
(0,18) 
Volume -0,127 
(-0,81) 
-0,132 
(-0,60) 
-0,136 
(-0,62) 
-0,135 
(-0,61) 
-0,142 
(-0,64) 
-0,132 
(-0,60) 
-0,136 
(-0,62) 
# Covenants 0,000 
(0,00) 
 
0,003 
(0,06) 
 
0,001 
(0,02) 
 
0,001 
(0,02) 
 
0,001 
(0,03) 
 
0,001 
(0,01) 
 
0,001 
(0,02) 
 
Years 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 2002-2010 
6.2 Empirical Findings                                                                                                                          106 
 
 
Observations 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769 
Pseudo R2 0.4367 0.4377 0.4366 0.4367 0.4367 0.4130 0.4127 
p-value (Wald χ2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Time and Industry 
Dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Robustness 
All results presented here show a significant impact of high reputation on each of the 
three dependent variables: first rating action downgrade, yield spread, and gross 
spread. Reputation was measured as a reputation score in Fortune Most Admired 
Companies, where it is higher than average. To check for robustness, a variable 
measuring reputation by median rather than average was used. Table 9, Regression 1 
shows the logit regression on the variable “first rating action downgrade”; Regression 
2 shows the OLS regression on the variable “yield spread”; and Regression 3 shows 
the OLS regression on the variable “gross spread”. The results remain significant at the 
1% level even when the variable for reputation is based on the median. 
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Table 8: Robustness 
This table contains the results of the logit and OLS regressions on the corporate bond´s performance (measured as downgrade in 
the first rating (1)) and company costs (measured as yield spread (2) and gross spread (3)). The bond issues have been taken 
place between 2002 and 2010 and have been supervised by different underwriter. All variables are defined and explained in 
table 1. Z statistics are based on standard errors which are called "White” and “issuer-clustered”. "Issuer-clustered" follows the 
issuer-cluster standard errors referred to Petersen (2009). All regressions consider time and industry dummies. Statistical 
significance is on the 0.01(***), 0.05(**)  0.10(*)-level. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Syndicate w/o 
’compliance’case 
 
Fraction LU 
´restatement´ case 
-0,093 
(-1,22) 
 
 
 
 
1,877 
(0,29) 
 
 
 
 
0,160 
(0,95) 
 
    
Fraction LU ´class 
action´ case 
       
Fraction LU 
´bribery/corruption´ 
case 
 
       
Fraction LU 
´misu/misappr/ 
embezz case´ 
 
       
Fraction LU 
´settlement´ case 
       
Fraction LU ´money-
laundering´ case 
       
LU was LU for same 
Issuer before 
-0,128 
(-1,83)* 
 
-28,472 
(-5,38)*** 
 
-0,364 
(-1,15) 
 
    
Parent Rep FMAC 
Score larger med. 
-0,427 
(-3,77)*** 
 
-30,543 
(-4,54)*** 
 
-0,649 
(-2,98)*** 
 
    
Callable 0,065 
(0,84) 
 
4,066 
(0,81) 
 
0,408 
(1,67)* 
 
    
Clawback -0,210 
(-2,30)** 
 
1,070 
(-0,16) 
 
2,715 
(3,36)*** 
 
    
Credit Rating 0,159 
(0,29) 
-20,329 
(-12,49)*** 
-0,730 
(-10,35)*** 
    
Make Whole 0,165 
(2,18)** 
8,708 
(1,71)* 
1,208 
(2,25)** 
    
Maturity 0,215 
(2,22)** 
-105,647 
(-14,19)*** 
1,757 
(5,48)*** 
    
NYSE/AMEX -0,376 
(-3,19)*** 
-39,615 
(-2,19)** 
-0,050 
(-0,10) 
    
Public Firm 0,007 
(0,06) 
-2,407 
(-0,15) 
-0,671 
(-1,72)* 
    
Putable 1,394 
(1,75)* 
146,496 
(3,11)*** 
-1,938 
(-3,28)*** 
    
SEC144A -0,022 
(-0,22) 
10,898 
(1,17) 
18,178 
(1,11)*** 
    
Senior unsecured -0,083 
 (-1,05) 
-22,213 
 (-3,98)*** 
0,087 
(-0,12) 
    
Top 8 LUs 0,668 
(7,89)*** 
-10,609 
(-1,84)* 
0,064 
(0,28) 
    
Volume -0,102 
(-2,10)** 
-13,240 
(-3,71)*** 
0,124 
(-0,80) 
    
# Covenants -0,000 
(-0,06) 
 
0,601 
(1,04) 
 
0,000 
(0,00) 
 
    
Years 
Observations 
2002-2010 
6009 
2002-2010 
5639 
2002-2010 
1769 
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Pseudo R2 0.1144 0.6125 0.4368     
p-value (Wald χ2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     
Time and Industry 
Dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes     
 
 
Other controls: bond performance 
The control variables used here focus on results that are significant at the 1% level. 
The logit regression shows bonds issued by firms listed on the NYSE or AMEX with a 
lower chance of being downgraded. This is in line with the findings concerning the 
reputation variable. Being listed on the NYSE or AMEX seems to be an indicator for 
value and reputation, and is thus of value in the market. Again, these results counter 
those in the literature, namely Andres et al. (2014)
455
 and Rhee and Valdez (2009).
456
 
The present results confirm those of Andres et al. (2014) that bonds underwritten by 
Top 8 lead underwriters have a significantly higher chance of a downgrade. 
Bloomberg‟s league table lists banks on the basis of e.g. market share and volume. 
These results, in combination with the present findings concerning the Fortune Most 
Admired Score, show that Top 8 lead underwriters in the league table do not seem to 
have a high reputation. In other words being one of the most economically successful 
banks seems, from the market‟s point of view, to be connected with low reputation. 
Other controls: underwriter fees 
The OLS regression on yield spread shows significant results for the control variable 
“maturity”. In line with the literature, from Helwege and Turner (1999), through 
Livingston and Zhou (2010), to Andres et al. (2014), the coefficient of maturity is 
significantly negative. The spread rises with maturity. 
The specific credit rating on notch level from S&P at the point of bond issue shows 
significant negative results.  
 
 
 
                                                          
455
 Cf. Andres et al. (2014), p. 6 
456
 Cf. Rhee and Valdez (2009), p. 146. 
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Regression model validation 
Multi-collinearity can be excluded, as the pair-wise correlations in Table 2 are all 
lower than 0.8. To check for homoscedasticity the White test was performed for all 
regressions subject to the prediction of the null hypothesis H0 that the variance shows 
homoscedasticity. This is the case when p has a value of 0.05 or lower. The Durbin 
Watson test in each regression checks for autocorrelation by using the heteroscedastic 
and autocorrelation robustness estimator. Analogously to the White test, the value of p 
has to be 0.05 or lower to prove the null hypothesis H0. In both tests the null 
hypothesis H0 can be confirmed, indicating homoscedasticity and positive 
autocorrelation for all regressions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
This final section concludes the aims, processes and results developed in the present 
thesis and outlines the implications of its findings for banks, companies and investors 
in their role as participants in the financial market. Furthermore, the chapter provides 
an outlook based on the empirical findings of the thesis, with ideas for future research. 
All of these issues are formulated under the main question of how behavior can 
influence trust between two parties. In particular in what way integrity and reputation, 
as immaterial values, can influence the relationship between companies and investors 
on the one hand and banks on the other.     
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7.1 Summary 
 
The trend in scientific economics shows that interest in corporate governance is rising 
rapidly. Of course the rise of misbehavior in the whole capital market is one reason for 
this trend, which affects many countries, including the industrialized ones. Hence it is 
even more important to find new ways and methods to make immaterial values 
measurable. Obviously this is difficult. It has, then, been the aim of this thesis to find 
new ways of measuring integrity. 
The Introduction to the thesis identified and illustrated the development of 
misbehavior in capital markets. It was then necessary to clarify the main problem 
causing financial market participants to break the law. So Chapter 2 discussed the 
principal-agent problem and highlighted its treatment in the literature from the 
beginning to the present day. This suggested that solutions or approaches are possible 
if certain terms are defined clearly as a first step. Thus Chapter 2 contained definitions 
of the two immaterial values of integrity and reputation, as well as the Fortune Most 
Admired Score in its role as an accepted measurement of reputation. 
The theoretical part of this thesis was completed with Chapter 3, which described the 
way the literature has dealt with issues of misbehavior in terms of the variables newly 
introduced in this thesis. These are "restatements of operating results", "money-
laundering", "settlement payments", "corruption and bribery", "misuse", 
"misappropriation", "embezzlement" and "class action lawsuits". The establishment of 
these variables represents a distinctive contribution of the thesis to the science of 
economics. 
The foundation has thus been laid to create new variables for measuring integrity and 
test its impact on  bond performance and company´s costs: variables which, to the best 
of the author‟s knowledge, have not been used so far. The approach is via 
measurement of violations of integrity. So Chapter 4 shows in particular the way these 
new variables were set up. It starts with the development of hypotheses formulating in 
general terms that there is a connection between the way a bank behaves and the 
performance of bonds they are supervising. It continues by illustrating the way the new 
variables are created, and adds the relevant control variables, which have already 
proven necessary in this context to complete the data set. Chapter 5 presents the 
7.2 Implications for market participants and future research                                                    112 
 
 
method of regression analysis as the principal instrument for the empirical aspect of 
the research. 
After explaining the data, Chapter 6 presents the results. These show a strong 
connection between bank reputation and performance of corporate bonds on the one 
hand, and high reputation and higher fees on the other. In contrast integrity is still a 
relatively unexplored area and consistently none of the results for performance or costs 
is significant. Either the variables in this thesis actually do not measure integrity or the 
market does not value it. The results for high reputation remain significant if 
robustness is tested by replacing “higher reputation than average ”with“ median”.  
Although these results focus on the capital market, and in particular on the process of 
certification, their main thrust is transferable to every process on the capital market. 
 
7.2 Implications for market participants and future research 
Although most of the present results concerning integrity and performance, as well as 
integrity and costs, have been non-significant, significance is evident for restatements 
of operating results and for corruption and bribery. The lack of clarity in many, if not 
most, results may derive from the fact that the importance of compliance has only 
started to grow in the last few years, when the market has become increasingly 
conscious of this topic.   
The period of observation of this thesis lies between 2002 and 2010 but, as observed in 
the Introduction, the frequency of misbehavior has risen especially in more recent 
years, namely in 2012, 2013 and 2014. A future investigation focusing on these years 
may well add clarity to the results of the present study. 
Nevertheless, the results adduced for the impact of reputation are obvious. The Fortune 
Score confirms its approved role in the field of economic science as a measure of 
reputation. Summing all these results up, companies and banks should become more 
aware of their behavior. Good behavior and sustainability are values to be considered 
in everyday work. The importance of reputation can already be measured, and it is just 
a matter of time before the value of further and yet more immaterial values becomes 
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public. The fact that results are becoming increasingly verifiable already demonstrates 
a growth in market participants‟ awareness. 
It could also be interesting to investigate the relation between the monetary advantages 
due to e.g. bribery and the disadvantages caused by fines. If the advantages achieved 
by misbehavior still in the end pay off, market participants may be aware of this fact 
and therefore have no reason to condemn the practices concerned.  
A distinctive relationship can certainly be perceived in the fact that all the coefficients 
are as expected, and at least some of the results demonstrate significance. In this light, 
an alternative approach may be helpful. With regard to the context, only individual 
proxies represent complex circumstances, but the way in which the variables for 
integrity are connected with each other remains as yet unknown. Further analysis 
might explain whether, and if so how, these variables are connected. This approach 
would aim to structure the proxies for integrity into factors according to a 
mathematical algorithm.
457
 
The creation of new variables for measuring integrity could be implemented in future 
research.  Here, synonyms may lead to better results. Moreover, as the present 
investigation was confined to the American market, results from other countries might 
be added and could well vary the picture. Summing up, there is a good deal of scope 
here for future research. 
Finally, this thesis ends as it started, with a quotation from Warren Buffet, who said:"It 
takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. If you think about that, you'll do 
things differently." 
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 Cf. Brosius (2004), p. 773. 
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Annex 
 
 
Overview of Economic Papers using Fortune’s ‘Most Admired Companies’ Score 
Authors Year Title Source The influence of... Result 
Filbeck, G.G. 
Groman, R.F. 
Zhao, X. 
2013 Are the best of the best 
better than the rest? The 
effect of multiple 
rankings on company 
value. 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 
No. 4, p. 695-722. 
listing in the Fortune 
ranking on company 
performance. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Companies listed in the 
Fortune or Best 
Corporate Citizens 
ranking have sustainably 
better earnings per share. 
 
If the company is listed 
in two or three ratings it 
obtains above-average 
returns. This is not the 
case if the company is 
listed in all of the four 
considered ratings at the 
same time. 
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Maug, E. 
Niessen-Ruenzi, A. 
Zhivotova, E. 
2013 Pride and Prestige: Why 
Some Firms Pay Their 
CEOs Less. 
Working paper. reputation on CEO 
salaries. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Higher reputation leads 
to lower salaries. 
Cao, Y. 
Myers, J.N. 
Myers, L.A. 
Omer, T.C. 
2013 Company Reputation and 
the Cost of Equity 
Capital. 
Working paper. reputation on equity 
financing. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Companies with a higher 
reputation have lower 
costs of equity capital. 
Cao, Y. 
Myers, L.A. 
Omer, T.C. 
2012 Does Company 
Reputation Matter for 
Financial Reporting 
Quality? Evidence from 
Restatements. 
Working paper. reputation on the quality 
of financial reporting. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Higher reputation leads 
to higher quality of 
financial reporting. 
The quality of the 
estimated provisions is 
higher if the company 
has a higher reputation. 
 
Companies with a higher 
reputation have to pay a 
higher fee to their 
auditors. 
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Sum, V. 2012 Most Ethical Companies 
and Stock Performance: 
Empirical Evidence. 
International Research Journal of Applied Finance, 
p. 1286-1292. 
reputation on share 
performance. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Companies with a high 
reputation generate 
particularly high share 
performance in 
comparison to the 
market. 
Anginer, D. 
Warburton, A.J. 
Yildizhan, C. 
2011 Corporate Reputation and 
Cost of Debt. 
Working paper. reputation on borrowing 
costs. 
The authors find 
significant influence: bad 
reputation leads to higher 
borrowing costs. 
Belascu, L. 
Herciu, M. 
Ogrean, C. 
2011 Managing Corporate 
Reputation in Times of 
Global Changes and 
Turbulence – A Strategy 
of Competiveness. 
Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing 7, p. 
726 – 733. 
industry on reputation. The authors find 
significant influence: 
Specific industries have a 
higher reputation. 
Flatt, S.J. 
Kowalczyk, S.J. 
2011 Corporate Reputation 
Persistence and Its 
Diminishing Returns. 
International Jourrnal of Business and Social 
Science, p. 1 – 10. 
former performance and 
reputation on future 
performance. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Former financial 
performance has a 
significant influence on 
future reputation. 
Annex                                                                                                                                                         139 
 
 
Anginer, D. 
Statman, M. 
2010 Stocks of Admired 
Companies and Spurned 
Ones. 
 
The Journal of Portfolio Management 36, p. 71 – 
77. 
reputation on earnings 
per share. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
higher reputation leads to 
lower earnings per share. 
Stuebs, M. 
Sun, L. 
2009 Business Reputation and 
Labor Efficiency, 
Productivity and Cost. 
Journal of Business Ethics 96, No.2, p. 256 - 283.  reputation on labor 
efficiency, labor 
productivity and cost of 
labor. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
High reputation is related 
to labor efficiency and 
productivity. 
No proven influence of 
reputation on labor costs. 
Anginer, D. 
Fisher, K.L. 
Statman, M. 
2008a Affect in Behavioral 
Asset-Pricing Model. 
Financial Analyst Journal 64, p. 20 – 29. reputation on earnings 
per share. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Higher reputation leads 
to lower earnings per 
share. 
Anginer, D. 
Fisher, K.L. 
Statman, M. 
2008b Stocks of admired 
companies and despised 
ones 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=962168 subjective perception on 
asset pricing. 
Positively perceived 
shares lead to a higher 
price. 
Fombrun, C.J. 2007 List of Lists: A 
Compilation of 
International Corporate 
Reputation Ratings. 
Corporate Reputation Review 10, p. 144 – 153. comparison of different 
reputation ranking. 
Comparison of 183 
reputation lists across 38 
countries. 
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Gössling, T. 
Vocht, C. 
2007 Social Role Conceptions 
and CSR Policy Success. 
Journal of Business Ethics 74, p. 363 – 372. fulfillment of social 
commitments on 
reputation. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
social commitments lead 
to higher reputation. 
Anderson, J. 
Smith, G. 
2006 A Great Company Can 
Be a Great Investment. 
Financial Analyst Journal 62, p. 86 – 93. reputation on earnings 
per share. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Higher reputation leads 
to higher earnings per 
share. 
Cho, H.J. 
Pucik, V. 
2005 Relationship between 
Innovativeness, Quality, 
Growth, Profitability, and 
Market Value. 
Strategic Management Journal 26, p. 555 – 575. capability of innovation 
and quality on financial 
performance. 
The authors find 
significant influence: the 
capability of innovation 
and quality leads to 
higher sustainable 
performance. 
Eberl, M. 
Schwaiger, M. 
2005 Corporate reputation: 
disentangling the effects 
on financial performance. 
European Journal of Marketing 39, p. 838 – 854. corporate reputation on 
future financial 
performance. 
The authors find 
significant influence: The 
cognitive component of 
reputation has a positive 
impact on future financial 
performance, the 
affective component has 
a negative impact. 
Flanagan, D.J. 
O`Shaughnessy, K.C. 
2005 The Effect of Layoffs on 
Firm Reputation. 
Journal of Management 31, p. 445 – 463. redundancies on 
reputation. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Redundancies lead to 
worse reputation. 
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Schwaiger, M. 2004 Components and 
Parameters of Corporate 
Reputation – An 
Empirical Study. 
Schmalenbach Business Review 56, p. 46 – 71. corporate reputation on 
sustainable profits. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Reputation is two-
dimensional: The 
cognitive component 
(“competence”) has a 
positive influence and the 
affective component 
(“sympathy”) has a 
negative influence. 
Roberts, P.W. 
Dowling, G.R. 
2002 Corporate Reputation and 
sustained superior 
financial Performance. 
Strategic Management Journal 23, p. 1077 – 1093. reputation on financial 
performance. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
higher reputation leads to 
better financial 
performance. 
Chun 
Eneroth 
Schneeweis 
2003 Corporate reputation and 
investment performance: 
the UK and U.S. 
experience 
Research in International Business and Finance 
17.273 (2003): 91 
reputation on future 
performance 
Higher reputation leads 
to higher returns. 
Big companies have a 
higher reputation. 
Sonnenfeld, J.A. 2002 What makes great boards 
great? 
Harvard Business Review. reputation on the 
composition of the board 
of directors. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
reputable companies have 
a characteristic 
composition of the board 
of directors. 
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Hutton, J.G. 
Goodman, M.B. 
Alexander, J.B. 
Genest, C.M. 
2001 Reputation management: 
the new face of corporate 
public relations? 
Public Relations Review 27, p. 247 – 261. expenses for corporate 
communication on 
reputation. 
No significant influence 
established. 
Riahi-Belkaoui, A. 2001 Corporate Reputation, 
Internalization and the 
Market Valuation of 
Multinational Firms. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=412005. reputation and 
internationality on 
market value. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
reputation and 
internationality lead to a 
higher market value. 
Zyglidopoulos, S.C. 2001 The Impact of Accidents 
on Firms‟ Reputation for 
Social Performance. 
Business Society 40, p. 416 – 441. industrial accidents on 
reputation. 
No significant influence 
established. 
Antunovich, P. 
Laster, D. 
Mitnick, S. 
2000 Are High-Quality Firms 
Also High-Quality 
Investments? 
Current Issues in Economics and Finance 6, p.  reputation on earnings. The authors find 
significant influence: 
Higher reputation leads 
to higher earnings. 
Barrett, J.D. 
Williams, R.J. 
2000 Corporate philanthropy, 
criminal activity, and 
firm reputation: is there a 
link? 
Journal of Business Ethics 26, p. 341 – 350. philanthropy and crime 
on reputation. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Philanthropy leads to 
higher reputation, crime 
to lower reputation. 
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Black, E.L. 
Carnes, T.A. 
Richardson, V.J. 
2000 The Market Valuation of 
Corporate Reputation. 
Corporate Reputation Review 3, p. 31 – 42. reputation on the market 
value of equity. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
higher reputation leads to 
a higher market value of 
equity. 
Cordeiro, J.J. 
Schwalbach, J. 
2000 Preliminary Evidence on 
the Structure and 
Determinants of Global 
Corporate Reputations. 
Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Management, 
Humboldt University, Berlin. Working Paper. 
national Fortune 
rankings on global 
Fortune ranking. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
rankings are nearly 
identical. 
Jones, B.H. 
Jones, G.H. 
Little, P. 
2000 Reputation as Reservoir: 
Buffering Against Loss in 
Times of Economic 
Crisis.  
Corporate Reputation Review 3, 21 – 29. reputation on stability in 
crises.  
Good corporate 
reputations provide a 
reservoir of goodwill 
which buffers companies 
from market decline in 
times of uncertainty and 
economic turmoil. 
Chun 
Eneroth 
Schneeweis 
2003 Corporate reputation and 
investment performance: 
the UK and US 
experience 
Research in International Business and Finance 
17.273 (2003): 91 
reputation on future 
performance 
Higher reputation leads 
to higher returns. 
Big companies have a 
higher reputation. 
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Antunovich, P. 
Laster, D. 
1998 Do Investors Mistake a 
Good Company for a 
Good Investment? 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=115020 reputation on earnings 
per share. 
The authors find 
significant influence: In 
the short run higher 
reputation leads to higher 
earnings per share. In the 
long run well admired 
firms are not overpriced. 
Brown, B. 1998 Do Stock Market 
Investors Reward 
Companies with 
Reputations for Social 
Performance? 
Corporate Reputation Review 3, p. 271 – 280. reputation on earnings 
per share. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
higher reputation leads to 
higher earnings per share. 
Carter, S.M. 
Dukerich, J.M. 
1998 Corporate Responses to 
Changes in Reputation. 
Corporate Reputation Review 1, p. 250 – 270. reputation on manager 
activity. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
changes in reputation can 
influence the activity of 
managers. 
Filbeck, G. 
Raymond, G. 
Preece, D. 
1998 Fortune‟s „Most Admired 
Companies‟ scale: An 
Investor‟s Perspective.  
Studies in Economics and Finance 18, p. 74 – 93. reputation on earnings. The authors find 
significant influence: 
higher reputation leads to 
higher earnings. 
Fombrun, C.J. 1998 Indices of Corporate 
Reputation: An Analysis 
of Media Rankings and 
Social Monitors' Ratings. 
Corporate Reputation Review 4, p. 327 – 340. a variety of corporate 
reputational rankings. 
Conclusion: The analysis 
reinforces the need for a 
more coherent conceptual 
framework to assess 
corporate reputations. 
Annex                                                                                                                                                         145 
 
 
Vergin, R.C.Qoronfleh, 
M.W. 
1998 Corporate reputation and 
the stock market. 
Business Horizons 41, p. 19-26. 
 
reputation on earnings 
per share in the future. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Higher reputation leads 
to higher earnings per 
share in the future. 
Stanwick, P.A. 
Stanwick, S.D. 
1998 The Relationship 
Between Corporate 
Social Performance, and 
Organizational Size, 
Financial Performance 
and Environmental 
Performance: An 
Empirical Examination. 
Journal of Business Ethics 17, p. 195 – 204. size of companies, 
profitability and noxious 
emissions on social 
performance.  
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Size of companies, 
higher profitability and 
lower noxious emission 
lead to better social 
performance. 
Griffin, J.J. 
Mahon, J.F. 
1997 The Corporate Social 
Performance and 
Corporate Financial 
Performance Debate. 
Twenty-Five Years of 
Incomparable Research. 
Business Society 36, p. 5 – 31. corporate social 
performance and 
financial performance. 
Fortune rankings are an 
accurate instrument for 
measuring corporate 
social performance. 
Koys, D.J. 1997 Human Resources 
Management and 
Fortune‟s Corporate 
Reputation Survey. 
Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, Vol. 
10, No. 2, p. 93-101. 
human resource 
management on 
corporate reputation. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Positive significant 
correlation between fair 
treatment of employees 
and a high reputation. 
Annex                                                                                                                                                         146 
 
 
Srivastava, R.K. 
McInish, T.H. 
Wood, R.A. 
Capraro, A.J. 
1997 How Do Reputations 
Affect Corporate 
Performance?: The Value 
of Corporate Reputation: 
Evidence from the Equity 
Markets 
Corporate Reputation Review, Volume 1, Number 
1, July 1, 1997 , pp. 61-68 
reputation on enterprise 
value. 
Higher reputation leads 
to higher shareholder 
wealth. 
Waddock, S.A. 
Graves, S.B. 
1997 Quality of Management 
and Quality of 
Stakeholder Relations. 
Are They Synonymous? 
Business Society 36, p. 250 – 279. quality of performance 
on the perceived quality 
of management 
(measured by Fortune 
ranking). 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
higher performance  
quality leads to higher 
perceived  management 
quality . 
Hammond, S.A. 
Slocum, J.W. 
1996 The impact of prior firm 
financial performance on 
subsequent corporate 
Reputations Ranking. 
Journal of Business Ethics 15, p. 159 – 165. financial performance on 
reputation. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
higher financial 
performance leads to 
higher reputation. 
Brown, B. 
Perry, S. 
1994 Removing the Financial 
Performance Halo From 
Fortune`s “Most 
Admired” Companies 
Academy of Management Journal 37, p. 1347 – 
1359. 
“financial halo” effect of 
Fortune ranking. 
Due to an influence on 
respondents of financial 
corporate success in the 
past, there is a bias in the 
Fortune data (“halo”). 
Presentation of a method 
to eliminate the halo-
effect. 
Annex                                                                                                                                                         147 
 
 
Fryxell, G.E. 
Wang, J. 
1994 The Fortune corporate 
„reputation‟ index: 
Reputation for what? 
Journal of Management, Volume 20, Issue 1, 
Spring 1994, Pages 1–14 
Fortune ranking in 
comparison to other 
models. 
The benefit of the 
Fortune ranking is 
limited for scientific 
purposes. 
Riahi-Belkaoui, A. 
Pavlik, E. 
1991 Asset Management 
Performance and 
Reputation Building for 
Large U.S. Firms. 
British Journal of Management 2, p. 231 – 238. 
 
asset management  
information on 
reputation.  
The authors find 
significant influence. 
More information on 
asset management leads 
to a higher reputation. 
Fombrun, C. 
Shanley, M. 
1990 What's in a Name? 
Reputation Building and 
Corporate Strategy 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2 
(Jun., 1990), pp. 233-258 
various factors on 
reputation. 
Stakeholders create the 
company‟s reputation 
based on information 
about performance and 
strategic orientation. 
McGuire, J.B. 
Schneeweis, T. 
Branch, B. 
1990 Perceptions of Firm 
Quality: A Cause or 
Result of Firm 
Performance. 
Journal of Management March 16, p. 167-180. financial indicators on 
the perceived quality of 
the company (measured 
by  Fortune ranking ). 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
good financial indicators 
lead to higher perceived 
quality of the company. 
Preston, L.E. 
Sapienza, H.J. 
1990 Stakeholder Management 
and Corporate 
Performance.  
Journal of Behavioral Economics 19, p. 361 – 375. stakeholder management 
on corporate 
performance. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
Satisfied stakeholders 
lead to better 
performance. 
Annex                                                                                                                                                         148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McGuire, J.B. 
Sundgren, A. 
Schneeweis, T. 
1988 Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Firm 
Financial Performance. 
Academy of Management Journal 31, p. 854 – 872. corporate social 
responsibility (measured 
by  Fortune ranking ) on 
financial performance. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
awareness of the 
company‟s social 
responsibility leads to 
higher financial 
performance. 
Spencer, B.A. 
Wokutch, R.E. 
1987 Corporate Saints and 
Sinners. The Effects of 
Philanthropic and Illegal 
Activity on 
Organizational 
Performance. 
California Management Review 29, p. 62 – 77. philanthropy and crime 
on performance. 
No significant influence 
established. 
Chakravarthy, B. 1986 Measuring Strategic 
Performance. 
Strategic Management Journal 7, p. 437 – 458. stakeholder satisfaction 
on strategic performance. 
The authors find 
significant influence: 
higher stakeholder 
satisfaction leads to 
higher strategic 
performance. 
